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NOTES
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE DUTY.
W. R. GRACE & CO. v. CAB*
WITH the end of the war and the release of pent-up private energies into,
the struggle for world airways, the Civil Aeronautics Board is increasingly
pressed to define the pattern for American participation in international air
transport. Having fostered an economy of controlled competition among
domestic airlines under the mandate of the Civil Aeronautics Act,1 the Board
has clearly announced its intention to apply similar economic principles in
the international field. 2 Thus, despite the predominance already attained'
by Pan American World Airways among international air carriers, competing
operations have commenced on European and Atlantic routes. But in Latin
* W. R. Grace & Co. v. CAB, Pan American Airways Corp., Pan American Airways,
Inc., Eastern Air Lines Inc., C. C. A. 2d, Jan. 28, 1946, p. 699, rehearing denied, Feb. 21,
1946, p. 933, remanding Panagra Terminal Investigation, 4 C.A.B. 670 (1944).
1. 52 STAT. 973 (1938), 49 U. S. C. § 401 (1940) (hereinafter cited by section number
only); RHYNE, CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT ANN. (1939) c. 11; Legis. (1938) 52 HARv. L. REv.
137. For the background of the industry and the Act, see RHYNE, supra, cc. 1-10; PuFFER,
AIR TRANSPORTATION (1941) cc. I-IV. Among the factors in the public interest, the Act
specifically adopts [§ 2(d)]: "Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound devel-
opment of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and
domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense."
See United Air Lines Trans. Corp.-Acquisition of Western Air Express Corp., 1 C.A.A.
Rep. 739, 741-50 (1939); United Air Lines Trans. Corp., Western Air Express Corp.,-
Interchange of Equipment, id. at 723, 725-33; Colonial Airlines, Inc.-Atlantic Seaboard
Operation, 4 C.A.B. 552, 554-5. The numerous considerations governing the Board in its
selection of a particular airline from among the applicants for a new route are discussed in
Frederick and Lewis, Air Routes and Public Policy (1941) 19 HARV. Bus. REV. 482; Melone,
Controlled Competition: Three Years of the Civil Aeronautics Act (1941) 12 J. AIR. L. 318;
PUFFER, supra, c. V. See also Healy, Workable Competition in Air Transportation (1945)
35 Am. EcoN. REv. Supp. 229; David, Discussion, id. at 249.
2. In American Export Airlines, Transatlantic Service, 2 C.A.B. 16, 29-35 (1940),
the Board first discussed and specifically adopted a policy of competition for international
air routes. In Northeast Airlines, Inc.,-North Atlantic Route Case, CAB Docket No. 855,
decided June 1, 1945, at 5-10, the question was reexamined in the light of post-war condi-
tions and the increase in foreign competition and the policy was reaffirmed. Cf. Lee, Mem-
ber, dissenting in I.A.T.A. Traffic Conference Resolution, Agreement CAB No. 493, ap-
proved Feb. 19, 1946. Under §§ 404 and 1002 (d) and (f) of the Act, the Board's control over
rates and services of international routes is less than over those of domestic airlines. This has
been construed as an additional argument in favor of the automatic regulatory effect of
competition for international routes. See American Export Airlines, supra, at 32, 34. The
great importance of international air transport as an instrument of national policy is clear.
The United States is the only nation which has not adopted a large measure of direct govern-
ment participation. See LiSSTzYzN, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT AND NATIONAL POLICY
(1942); REP. ATr'Y GEN., International Air Transport Policy, H. R. Doc. No. 142,79th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
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-America all presently profitable routes are still controlled by Pan American,
-which there has the crucial additional advantage of long-standing operational
and political entrenchment.' Though immediate and substantial increase in
the volume of air travel between the United States and Latin America is
.officially predicted, 4 no competition has yet been authorized.5 In the further
light of the special concern of national foreign policy with Latin American
-economic, political and military relations, the need for affirmative action in
this region is distinctly apparent. M. R. Grace & Company v. Civil Aero-
nautics Board 6 represents the efforts of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
to force an unwilling Board 7 to take action on the first challenge to Pan
American's hegemony in the Latin American air.
Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc., the subject of this controversy, was
-established in 1929 by agreement between Pan American and Grace for
operation from the Canal Zone south along the west coast of South America
to Buenos Aires.3 Owned equally by the two parents, Panagra was to be
managed by a divided Board of Directors, on which half of the members
represented Grace and half Pan American. Thus the capital and coiperation
-of Grace, parent of Grace Lines steamship company and dominant west-
-coast shipping and financial influence, were originally obtained for the
,entrance of a competing form of transportation into that region. But in
-operation Panagra has been merely a link in the Pan American system. The
-greater part of its traffic, though originating in or destined for the United
States, has been dependent on Pan American feeder lines for access to the
Canal Zone. And direct service from the United States to Buenos Aires via
the east coast has been wholly controlled by Pan AmericanY
In 1938, Panagra's routes and schemes of operation were impliedly sanc-
tionea when "public convenience and necessity" certificates were issued to
3. See BURDEN, TaE STRUGGLE rOR AIRWAYS IN LAYru; A nmIic (1943) pssirr;
Lissvirzr, op. cit. supra note 2, c. XIII. That the political influence of Pan American was
not confined to Latin American countries, see BuRDE, supra, at 23-6; PuFria, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 193-222; REP. AT'Y GEx., Supra note 2, at 1-3.
4. REP. ArT'Y GEN., supra note 2, at 10.
S. In the interests of national defense, a temporary certificate vas granted authorizing
service to Mexico City by American Airlines. American Airlines, Inc.-Mexico City Serv-
ice, 4 C.A.B. 647 (1944).
6. IV. R. Grace & Co. v. CAB, C.C.A. 2d, Jan. 28, 1946, p. 699, rlhearirg denied,
Feb. 21, 1946, p. 933.
7. Panagra Terminal Investigation, 4 C.A.B. 670 (1944).
8. The agreement between the two companies is set out in the court's statement of
facts. C.C.A. 2d, Jan. 28, 1946, pp. 700-2.
9. For the purposes of this Note, no distinction is made between Pan American Air-
ways Corporation, the holding company, and any of its subsidiaries. Pan American airlinea
operate to Balboa from Miami, New Orleans, Brownsville and Los Angeles, and to Buenos
Aires from Miami. 4 C.A.B. 671 (1944). Although the distance from Miami to Bueno3 Aires
is shorter via Panagra's west coast route, the necessity for a change of planes at the Canal
Zone largely counteracts that competitive advantage.
19461
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
existing airlines as required by the Act.1" The potential conflict implicit in
Panagra's structure, however, had already materialized in disagreements
between the parents on questions of route, flight equipment and ground
facilities." And in 1939, ten years after its birth, Panagra was finally split
by an irreconcilable controversy: Grace demanding, Pan American resisting,
an extension of its line to a terminal in the United States. When informal
attempts by the parties, and by the CAB, to arbitrate a settlement proved
unavailing,12 Grace took the problem to the Board in two formal petitions.
The first was a request in Grace's own name that the Board amend Pan-
agra's certificate to authorize the extension." The second was a specific
complaint of unfair trade practice on the part of Pan American in using its
50 percent vote to prevent an application for the extension by Panagra itself;
this complaint included a request that Pan American's stock ownership be
divested to prevent such negative control. 14 To the latter Pan American
later countered with similar charges and a request for divestment of Grace.'1
This conflict raised peculiar problems in which factual determination was
difficult, legal precedent lacking, and the power and duty of the CAB un-
clear. Tactic of the Board was ultimately to evade decision on these issues.
Electing not to undertake tentative and doubtful action on Grace's two peti-
tions, the Board disposed of them without decision by a careful procedure
which left it free to deal with the situation by other methods, Thus, the
Board instituted a proceeding on its own motion to inquire whether the
public convenience and necessity required the extension of Panagra's line. 10
But this inquiry also was eventually dismissed without decision, on the juris-
dictional ground that the Board had no power to order this extension on an
10. Sec. 401 (e); RHYN E, op. cit. supra note 1, at 103-4, n. 362. See Pan Arherican-
Grace Airways, Inc.-Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, 2 C.A.B. 104 (1940).
Further history of Panagra's operations is found in Pan-American-Grace Airways, Inc.-
Mail Rates, 3 C.A.B. 550, 553-7, 578-80 (1942).
11. Transcript of Testimony, CAB Docket No. 779, passim; C.C.A. 2d, Jan. 28, 1946,
p. 715 and n. 1c.
12. C.C.A. 2d, pp. 703-6, 708, n. 1.
13. CAB Docket No. 707, filed Dec. 16, 1941, under § 401(h) of the Act, which au-
thorizes the Board ". . . upon petition or complaint or upon its own initiative, . . . (to)
alter, amend, modify or suspend any such certificate, in whole or in part, if the public con-
venience and necessity so require." C.C.A. 2d, pp. 706-7, 721.
14. CAB Docket No. 744, filed April 29, 1942, under § 411 of the Act; this complaint
included a renewal of Grace's request in Docket No. 707. Sec. 411 authorizes the Board to
investigate and correct alleged unfair trade practices. C.C.A. 2d, p. 707, 719. See also
§ 1107 (g), which amends the Clayton Act [38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 21 (1940)] to
charge the CAB with enforcement of that statute.
15. Answer of Pan American, CAB Docket No. 744, filed Jan. 27, 1943. See C.C.A. 2d,
p. 711-2.
16. CAB Docket No. 779, instituted by Board Order of Sept. 10, 1942, decided May 24,
1944; Panagra Terminal Investigation, 4 C.A.B. 670 (1944). This proceeding was under
§ 401 (h), supra note 13. The Board Order recited Grace's two previous petitions and noted
that the public interest might require an additional airline to provide competition for Pan
American; the order is set out in the court's statement of facts, C.C.A. 2d, pp. 708-11.
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"unwilling" carrier. On Grace's appeal from the jurisdictional dismissal, the
Second Circuit through Judge Frank, noting the public interest in competi-
tion and sensing an evasion by the Board, remanded the case to the Board
with a clear directive to face the issue. The court found that the underlying
control fight had inevitably become the central element in the inquiry, and
that the Board had power in this proceeding to determine whether Pan
American's recalcitrance was fraudulent or illegal. Failure to exercise that
power and bring the matter to a close was held to be "beyond even that gen-
erous latitude which must be accorded to the Board's discretion." 17
The involved procedural history of this case testifies to the care with which
Board and court each guided the action along the desired course. From
among the welter of issues presented, no single question was clearly framed
and disposed of during the entire course of the proceeding. By undertaking
action on its own motion, the Board sidestepped consideration of the prob-
lems of Grace's independent standing to apply for Panagra's extension, and
of Pan American's alleged unfair trade practices, raised by Grace's two peti-
tions. In the Board hearing, Pan American early moved to dismiss on juris-
dictional grounds, but the Board deferred ruling until full hearing on the
merits. The lengthy evidence then taken covered in detail each parent's
charges of the other's self-interest in Panagra's management; but no opinion
was rendered on this question.'" And in eventually sustaining the jirisdic-
tional motion to dismiss the Board rejected Pan American's legal argument
in support of the motion. On appeal, the court denied without opinion sin-
cere contentions of Pan American and the Board that the Board order was
not reviewable and that Grace lacked standing to maintain the appeal.
Grace's primary claim, that it had been denied fair hearing on the jurisdic-
tional facts, was not mentioned in the opinion."8 Nor did the court examine
the merits of the Board's jurisdictional and factual holdings. The court itself,
during argument, raised the possibility that Grace's specific unfair trade
practice complaint against Pan American had in effect been incorporated in
the proceeding which the Board had instituted. ' But this suggestion was
dropped after additional briefing, and Pan American's alleged unfair trade
17. C.C.A. 2d, pp. 726-7.
18. C.C.A. 2d, p. 715 and n. 1c. The hearings in this case occupied -in veels, and four
thousand pages of testimony were taken; but there was no briefing or argument of the merits,
and no Examiner's Report was filed.
19. C.C.A. 2d, p. 718.
20. Argument in this case wras heard by the court on Nov. 12, 1945. Ia a letter of
Nov. 29, 1945, the court requested additional briefs of the parties on the following propcsi-
tion, not previously suggested by either party: That the Board Order instituting CAB
Docket No. 779 had direct reference to Grace's complaint in Docket No. 744, and that
therefore the Board had power in this proceeding to take action under § 411. Se notes 14
and 16 supra. Supplemental briefs were filed but no further oral argument was heard. Al-
though its decision is based on another ground, the court adds an appendix to its opinion,
in which the intricate arguments pro and con this proposition are set out, apparently as
alternative support for the decision in anticipation of appeal. C.C.A. 2d, pp. 721, 728-33.
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practices were held relevant to a possible derivative right of Grace to argue
that Panagra should be considered as applying for the extension,-a ra-
tionale neither suggested by Grace nor argued before the court.
Having thus deviously selected their points of attack, both Board and
Court resorted to intricate legal maneuvers to muster support for their con-
clusions. It is apparent at the outset that the structure of the corporation
with which the proceeding was ostensibly concerned is unique. Equal par-
ticipation in its ownership and control by the two overwhelmingly powerful
and basically opposed interests makes a palpable fiction of any attempt to
deal with Panagra as an independent entity. The Board, however, chose to
treat Panagra, actually an uncertain carrier, as an unwilling.carrier. Finding
no aid in legislative history or statutory construction, the Board then sought
guidance from the experience of the ICC. But the leading judicial expression
on the situation, wherein the carrier itself had not applied for the extension,
announced a technical rule that the agency could order no extension beyond
the territory the carrier originally undertook to serve. 1 This strict limitation
the Board explicitly denied, adopting instead a factual rule of reasonableness
and asserting power to order any extension which would not "transform the
character" of the reluctant carrier. While the practical applicability to air-
lines of rules evolved for surface carriers may be doubtful, nevertheless the
modifigation chosen by the Board permits a salutary flexibility in future
determinations under this standard. But in its application to this case, the
Board's factual conclusion that the proposed extension, urged by one half of
Panagra, would so transform this carrier, seems open to question. 22
The court, however, accepted this conclusion, and instead raised the issue
of Panagra's willingness. By an elusive process of reasoning it established
that Grace might be entitled in a derivative capacity to speak for Panagra,
in which case the Board could proceed as though Panagra were a willing
carrier voluntarily applying for the extension. In this process the court
placed reliance solely on an extension of the brief Supreme Court opinion
in SEC v. Okin.23 There it was held that Okin, a stockholder claiming fraud
21. 4 C.A.B. 676-7. In ICC v. Oregon-Washington R. Co., 288 U. S. 14, 39-42 (1933),
the Supreme Court indicated that no order would be constitutional which attempted to
compel a carrier to extend its service into a field beyond its "profession of service." The
Board quoted and adopted the language of the dissenting opinion in that case.
22. The Board found that the proposed extension would increase Panagra's route
mileage by 14%, and would require an additional capital investment of $800,000 as compared
with gross assets of $10,700,000 and a net worth of over $3,000,000. These factors, however,
were not controlling in its decisioni; more important was the fact that Panagra would be
changed from a connecting to a direct carrier and one operating "in competition with an
affiliated company." 4 C.A.B. 678.
23. SEC v. Okin, decided with American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 325 U. S. 385
(1945). Okin was a minority-stockholder of Electric Bond & Share Company. In a proceed-
ing before the SEC, the directors of Electric Bond & Share took a position favoring approval
of a plan to refinance a loan to a subsidiary at reduced interest. Okin claimed that this posl-
tion was motivated by fraud, and that the resultant approval of the plan ". . . would
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on the part of the controlling interest in stating his corporation's position
before the SEC, had sufficient interest to maintain appeal from the SEC
order. The court reasoned that, since Grace's position was analogous to that
of Okn, and since the interest necessary to maintain court review is at least
as great as that necessary to participate in an administrative proceeding,
Grace might therefore establish before the Board a right to speak for Pan-
agra in this proceeding.2 4 But in holding that the derivative ground only
incidental to the Oki case sustained Grace's position, the court treated that
case as in effect overruling an earlier clear holding of the Supreme Court.
The underlying question of Grace's standing to maintain review, however,
was never explicitly disposed of by the court. The appeal was apparently
allowed to Grace in a right derived from Panagra on the 0kn rationale. But
standard doctrine would require prior showing that the Board order was a
reviewable one,2 and that some economic injury would result to the appeal-
ing party.2 While both elements could be shown to exist under the peculiar
reduce the value of his stock by reducing the interest income of Electric Bond and Share."
325 U. S. at 387. Since Okhn's action was in the nature of a derivative cuit and recourc2 to
his Board of Directors would obviously be futile, the Court granted hin standing to appeal.
See Note (1945) 45 COL. L. REv. 771.
24. But Grace had never made this claim in this proceeding; it had in fact objected to
the introduction of its complaint against Pan American, and to the Board's conideration of
the controversy between the co-owners. C.C.A. 2d, pp. 713-1S, 71S. The court, however,
held that, the issue of Panagra's willingness being in the case, the Board had power to deter-
mine it. The Board's choice not to introduce that issue in this proceeding ,a held to be
beyond its discretion. C.C.A. 2d, p. 726, citing Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 66 Sup. Ct.
148 (U. S. 1945); cf. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134 (1940).
25. In Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. v. United States, 281 U. S. 479 (1930), a minority
stockholder sought to set aside an ICC order approving his company's abandonment of one
terminal and use of another; the minority stockholder there claimed that the position of the
controlling interest in favoring approval of the plan was actuated by fraud. But the Court
held that the issue of the majority's abuse of power could not properly be raised in this case,
and that the stockholder could not show such injury as a result of the order as would justify
a suit to set it aside. 281 U. S. at 486-7. In discussing this case the Second Circuit stated:
"In spite of some differences which we will point out, we might feel that decision conclusive
here, were it not for the decision in (the Oin case)." C.C.A. 2d, p. 723. The distinction,
however, was not pointed out. In the per curarn opinion denying rehearing, the court con-
tinued: "(The Pittsburgh case) involved nothing like the public interest patently here in-
volved; moreover, that case was decided before the recent doctrinal development above
noted." C.C.A. 2d, p. 937. See note 27 infra. But cf. Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United
States, 66 Sup. Ct. 247, 248 (U. S. 1946).
26. The Act provides [§ 1006(a)] that "Any order, affirmative or negative" of the Board
shall be subject to review. But the terms of the Board order in this case neither required nor
prohibited any action of either Panagra or Grace. Technically an unchallenged ruling of
law, it merely dismissed a proceeding initiated by the Board in its discretion.
27. Like other comparable statutes, the Act provides that a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity, grant of which is governed only by considerations of public interest,
conveys no proprietary right [§ 401 ()], and that appeal may be maintained "by any pzr.on
disclosing a substantial interest" in a Board order [§ 1006(a)]. The Supreme Court has
broadened traditional requirements of "standing to sue" to allow appeal from such adminis-
trative orders by persons showing only economic injury; but the party on appeal may argue
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facts of this case, neither is immediately apparent, and some discussion of
these points might have been expected.
Doctrinal and procedural devices aside, however, the variant decisions in
this case may be evaluated in terms of their practical results. The Board,
impliedly confessing impotence to remedy Panagra's "inherently bad" in-
ternal condition,8 effectively eliminated any question of extension of Panagra
in this or another proceeding. The court on the other hand forced reopening
of that question. While the original opinion of the court speaks only of pri-
vate rights of Panagra and Grace, under the goad of petitions for rehearing
the court set out the policy considerations which governea its decision.
There the court indicated a fear that denial of competition by Panagra
meant denial of the competitive principle; it therefore demanded explicit
examination of the. question in terms of the public interest. Noting the
broader aspect of the case, the opinion stated that the Board might "exercise
its statutory powers to rectify the situation in any way it deems wise," 20
and later pointed to "numerous provisions" of the Act authorizing the Board
to ". . . do the needful, with respect to the management and control of air
carriers." 10
But the practical possibility or desirability of the solution thus broadly
suggested by the court may be questioned. While the statute favors compe-
tition among airlines, it also anticipates the obvious monopolistic poten-
tialities inherent in surface carrier control of air transport. Recognized in
only questions relating to the public interest. See opinion denying rehearing, C.C,A, 2dt
pp. 934-8. The definitive study of this development is contained in the opinion of Judge
Frank in Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F. (2d) 694, 699-704 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943), dis-
missed as moot, 320 U. S. 707 (1943). See also Note (1940) 26 WAsH. U. L. Q. 121. But in
each of the cases in this development, the decision to grant appeal has been predicated on a
finding of some direct economic injury to the existing operations or business of the appealing
party. See FCC v. National Broadcasting Co., 319 U. S. 239 (1943), opinion of Mr. Justice
Douglas, dissenting, id. at 265, 266 (1944); Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 66 Sup. Ct. 148,
150-1 (U. S. 1945). And compare the cases discussed notes 23 and 25 supra. In the instant
case the only injury to Panagra (or its stockholder Grace) was the Board's denial of power
to order it to expand its present operations.
28. In the last two paragraphs of its opinion, the Board pointed out that "regardless of
which of the co-owners of Panagra is at fault" a decision by the Board on the merits would
not solve the basic difficulty, and continued: "We have sought remedy under the Civil Aero-
nautics Act, but after having the facts presented in extensive public hearings we must con-
clude that the Act does not give the Board the power to take the action contemplated by
this proceeding." 4 C.A.B. at 678, quoted, C.C.A. 2d, p. 718. See Pan American-Matson.
Inter-Island Contract, 3 C.A.B. 540 (1942). In that case the Board refused to approve a
contract between Pan American and two steamship companies, proposed subsequent to the
passage of Act, providing for a substantially identical 50% co-ownership arrangement for
air operation between the west coast of the United States and Hawaii. Noting the possibility
of deadlock, the Board also indicated disapproval of the surface-carrier influence and of the
restrictions on competition embodied in the contract. Id. at 547-8. See note 31 infra.
29. C.C.A. 2d, pp. 934-5.
30. Id. at 937. The court continued: "In the light of those provisions, we reject Pan
American's argument that the Board lacks 'all power to take the management of a corpora-
tion out of the hands of its directors.' " But see note 32 infra.
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other opinions of the Board, 31 the possibility of surface carrier self-preference
is amply illustrated in the evidence taken on the cross-charges of Pan
American against Grace. Thus the benefit to the public interest of an exten-
sion of Panagra's line seems doubtful. The practical operation of the line
still subject to the vicissitudes of divided control, extension would provide at
best only very limited competition for Pan American, and would at the same
time extend the influence of both Pan American and the surface carrier.
Further, apart from the practical difficulty of determining which of the two
parents can be said to represent the "true" interest of Panagra, even com-
plete divestiture of either parent would offer an unhappy choice between
promoting an aviation monopoly or subjecting air transport to further con-
trol by a competing mode of transportation. Moreover, since the applicable
provisions of the Act are wholly prospective, they confer no authority to
disrupt control relationships antedating the statute.3 2
Finally, the urgent necessity in the public interest to seize on the first offer
of competition, however unsatisfactory, is not apparent. The fluid expan-
sion of international air transport, and the eagerness of airlines to enter all
areas, suggest limitless possibilities for collateral attack on the problem. In
every proceeding on international air routes the Board has heard and spe-
cifically rejected Pan American's claim for single rights.3 3 In specific recog-
31 Under § 408 (b), the Board may approve consolidations and other acquisitions of
control of air carriers, provided that the consolidation will not create monopoly or jeopard-
ize another air carrier, and provided further that if the applicant for control is not an air
carrier, the Board shall not approve the consolidation vnless " . . it finds that the tranzac-
tion proposed will promote the public interest by enabling such carrier other than an air
carrier to use aircraft to public advantage in its operation and will not restrain competition."
See. 413 provides that "control" means either direct or indirect control; and the Board has
applied these provisions in cases of negative control. Railroad Control of Northeast Air-
lines, 4 C.A.B. 379 (1943). The Board interprets the second proviso of § 408 (b) as limiting
strictly the participation of surface carriers to air operations which would ba merely auxil-
iary and incidental to their other operations. American Export Lines, Control-Amer.
Export Air., 3 C.A.B. 619, 624-5, 626-30 (1942); id. 4 C.A.B. 104, 106 (1943); Railroad
Control of Northeast Airlines, supra at 3S1, 335; Local, Feeder, and Pick-up Air Service,
6 C.A.B. 1, 7-S (1944); cf. Pan American Airway Co. v. CAB, 121 F. (2d) 810 (C.C.-.
2d, 1941).
32. The court cited §§ 407-9,411-3,415. C.C.A. 2d, p.937, n. 5. See also § 1002, 1007,
1106; RH=Yx, op. cit. supra note 1, at 141, n. 488 and 139-49; PUFFER, op. cit. supra note 1,
cc. VIII, IX. The Act, however, nowhere confers specific authority to order divetment;
apart from investigations, specific cease and desist orders, prohibited interlocling director-
ates and pooling agreements, etc., its authority over control relationships is limited to the ap-
proval of acquisitions of control subsequent to the Act. See Railroad Control of Northeast
Airlines, 4 C.A.B. 379, 386 (1943), and note 31 supra.
33. See note 2 supra; American Export Airlines, Transatlantic Service, 2 C.A.B. 16,
29-35 (1940); Northeast Airlines, Inc.,--North Atlantic Route Case, CAB Dochet No. 855,
decided June 1, 1945, at 7-8. In the American Export case, supra, the Board held that a
competing service should be authorized for transatlantic service in spite of proof that the
cost to the public in air-mail payments would be considerably higher than if Pan American
carried the traffic on additional flights. See also Pan American Ainys Co. (Del.)-Trans
atlantic Operations, 1 C.A.B. 118, 129-33 (1939), in which the Board refused to allot all cix
weekly landing rights in Europe to Pan American, since to do so would prevent future corn-
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nition of the Latin American situation, the Board in 1943 instituted the
important Latin American Proceeding in which numerous route applications
were consolidated in order to determine an integrated pattern of air transport
for the whole region.34 While the Board decision in that case, though ex-
pected momentarily, has not yet been published, the detailed Examiners'
Report offers tangible proposals addressed directly to the instant problem.
Reaffirming the Board's interest in competition and its restriction on surface
-carrier control, and noting Panagra's need for independent connection to the
United States,35 the Examiners recommend that two new lines be authorized
-to operate to the Canal Zone. Specifically, extension of Eastern from Miami
is suggested to supply direct service from New York to Panagra's northern
terminal, and a route from Houston operated by Braniff to serve the middle
-west.36 Although the present traffic potential is not considered sufficient to
-warrant additional service south of the north coast of South America,3" the
-presence of Eastern and Braniff at the Canal Zone would enable the Board
-to extend them south whenever appropriate.
Thus, while this case will serve as an object lesson to the Board on its
vulnerability to the expanding scope of judicial review, it also emphasizes
-with renewed clarity certain limitations surrounding judicial determination
.of the public interest at the instance of "private Attorney Generals." 31
For in this case the court's decision, that the public interest required exami-
nation of Grace's rights, was made without the benefit of argument directed
to that point.3 9 Moreover, the result of the court's action may be to delay
realization of the very public interest it so fervently advocates; Grace may
now ask postponement of other authorizations until its newly discovered
rights have been ruled upon.41
petition. Compare the Board's refusal to approve a contract between Pan American and
American Export for division of landing rights, PUFFER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 510.
34. See Letter from the President to the CAB, Sept. 7, 1943, and CAB Release, Sept. 9,
1943, both quoted in Colonial Airlines, Inc.-Atlantic Seaboard Operations, 4 C.A.B. 392,
395, n. 9 (1943); REP. ATT'v Gmi., supra note 2, at 10. Applications for extensive routes in
Latin America were filed in 1943 by 13 airlines and 4 steamship companies, including one by
Grace Lines, Inc., subsidiary of W. R. Grace & Co. Examiners' Report, iufra note 35, at 3.
35. Latin American Service, CAB Docket No. 525, Examiners' Report, served Mar. 5,
1945, at 123-32, 138.
36. Id. at 137-44, 162. Although Panagra will thus still be dependent on connections
at the Canal Zone, the Examiners point out the ". . . probability that a close connecting
service and perhaps an interchange equipment arrangement will be effected between Panagra
and the new operator." Id. at 135.
37. Id. at 132-6.
38. C.C.A. 2d, p. 935, n. 2, citing Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F. (2d) 694, 704.
See note 27 supra.
39. Thus the court, in remanding, could see "no conceivable reason" for the Board's
failure to consider the question of Grace's unexpressed claim to speak for Panagra. C.C.A.
2d, p. 726.
40. On Feb. 5, 1946, Grace filed a motion with the Board requesting that any steps
taken by the Board in the Latin American Proceeding, toward granting a route from Balboa
to the United States to any other carrier than Panagra, be withheld pending further pro-




THE SARATOGA SPRINGS CASE*
UNDERLYING all theories of intergovernmental tax immunity is the pre-
mise that one sovereign government should not be subjected to the domina-
tion of another.' However, the search for new tax revenues by federal and
state governments has periodically collided with this philosophy of sov-
ereignty. The conflict has forced recurrent definition of the extent of gov-
ernmental immunity from taxation in a federated nation.2
As a matter of political theory and in many earlier decisions, tax immu-
nity between the states and the federal government was considered equal
and reciprocal.3 But more recently, the federal government has enjoyed
greater judicial protection from state taxation than the states have from
federal taxation.4 Two rationalizations for this have been adv-anced.
First, by their representation in Congress, the states have a legislative
safeguard against undesired federal taxation; whereas, the federal govern-
ment, being unrepresented in state legislative processes, must rely upon
judicial protection. 5 Secondly, since the federal government has only dele-
gated powers, any activity it undertakes in carrying these powers into effect
is governmental in nature, hence immune from state taxation ;i whereas,
- State of New York v. United States, 66 Sup. Ct. 310 (U. S. 1946).
1. 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL Linr.rioNs (8th ed. 1927) 989; WILLIs, Co.sartr-
TIOxAL LAW (1936) c. 2; Cohen, Federal Taxation of State Actirities arf State Taxation of
Federal Actizities (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 807; Powell, INational Taxation of State Instrtnm n-
talities (1936) 20 U. OF ILL. STUDIES IN THE Socmu. ScIENcEs No. 4.
2. The leading cases are: McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819); Col-
lector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870); Dobbins v. Commissoners, 16 Pet. 435 (U. S.
1842); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437 (1905); Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S.
216 (1931); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134 (1937) 114 A. L. R. 318, 347
(1938); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405 (1938); Graves v. New York cx rd. O'Keefe,
306 U. S. 466, 120 A. L. R. 1466, 1477 (1939); United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U. S.
174 (1944). For analysis of recent cases see, Pow ell, The Waning of Intergcenrmental Tax
Immunities (1945) 58 HAnv. L. REv. 633; The Remnant of Intergorernmental Tax Immunaties
(1945) 58 HAnv. L. REv. 757.
3. See note I supra; Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870); Se Ambromni v.
United States, 187 U. S. 1, 7 (1902); Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosiean, 291 U. S.
466, 471 (1934).
4. See Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 415-6 (1938); Gravesv. New York ex rel.
O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 478, 485 (1939). In terms of actual tax receipts, the states undoubt-
edly get more from the federal government than the latter gets from the states. This is ex-
plained by the greater volume of taxable activities of the federal government. But given
similar undertakings, the judicial tests for taxability have placed the federal government in a
better position than the states. Compare Allen v. Regents, 304 U. S. 439 (1938) with
United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U. S. 174 (1944).
5. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,435-6 (U.S. 1819); Veston v. Charles-
ton, 2 Pet. 449,465-6 (U. S. 1829); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405,415-6 (1938).
6. No case squarely decides this, but see, Graves v. New Yor: x rel. O'Keefe, 306
U. S. 466, 477 (1939). "As that government derives its authority wholly from powers dele-
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the states, having all reserved powers, may engage in activities of a business
or "proprietary" nature not intrinsically connected with their sovereign
functions of government, which activities are tdxable.7
The first reason for giving greater judicial protection to federal immunity
than to state immunity appears considerably vitiated by cases holding that
Congress may immunize a federal instrumentality if it so chooses.8 Thus, in
fact, the federal government has Congressional protection and need rely
neither upon state legislatures nor upon the federal courts. The logic of this
argument and the present chaos of juridical doctrine 9 suggest that inter-
government tax immunity policy is more properly charted by legislative
action than by judicial decision.
The second theory by which state immunity has been restricted, the gov-
ernmental-proprietary test regarding the nature of the activity, is conclu-
sively abandoned in New York v. United States.10 Suit was instituted by the
United States against the State of New York and the Saratoga Springs au-
thority to recover taxes assessed on the sale of bottled mineral waters taken
from Saratoga Springs, New York. In permitting the federal government to
tax New York on these receipts, six members of the court agreed that "the
distinction between 'governmental' and 'proprietary' interests" of the states
is untenable." Elimination of this distinction, might seem logically to require
equalizing state and federal tax immunity. On several occasions, however,
including the instant case, the court has iustained a federal tax levied di-
rectly on a state enterprise, 1 2 but never a state tax levied directly upon a
federal enterprise.' 3 Thus, although the court has abandoned the remaining
gated to it by the Constitution, its every action within its constitutional power is govern-
mental action, and since Congress is made the sole judge of what powers within the con-
stitutional grant are to be exercised, all activities of government constitutionally authorized
by Congress must stand on a parity with respect to their constitutional immunity from
taxation." For criticism of this view see Note, State Taxation of Federal "Proprietary" In.
strumentalities (1937) 11 TxMP. L. Q. 383; Powell, supra note 2, at 653-4.
7. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437 (1905); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S,
360 (1934); Accord: Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (1934); cf. Allen v. Regents, 304
U. S. 439 (1938).
8. Smith v. Kansas City Title and Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180 (1921); Federal Land
Bank v. Crosland, 261 U. S. 374 (1923); Pittman v. HOLC, 308 U. S. 21 (1939); Federal
Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U. S. 95 (1941); Maricopa County v. Valley Na-
tional Bank of Phoenix, 318 U. S. 357 (1943); City of Cleveland v. United States, 323 U. S.
329 (1945). The question of whether Congress has power to grant tax exemptions extending
beyond the constitutional immunity of federal agencies which courts may imply has not
been decided. See Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 478 (1939).
9. "Looking backward it is easy to see that the line between the taxable and the im-
mune has been drawn by an unsteady hand." United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U. S
174, 176 (1944). See note 2 supra.
10. State of New York v. United States, 66 Sup. Ct. 310 (U. S. 1946).
11. Id.at316.
12. See note 7 supra.
13. Direct taxes were invalidated in Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441 (1943); Van
Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151 (1886); New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U. S. 547
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reason for making a distinction between the extent of state immunity and
that of the federal government, it has not, as a concomitant, placed the im-
munities on a par.
Seriatim opinions in the instant case create uncertainty in the fundamental
rationale, but the precipitate of common agreement suggests certain bases
for predicting future tax immunity decisions. First, Mr. Justice Franks-
furter, who delivered the judgment of the court, purports to introduce a new
criterion of validity-that the tax be non-discriminatory.14 In his view a
tax is non-discriminatory if it applies to both state and private enterprises of
a like nature; it becomes discriminatory when levied on any activity pecu-
liar to the state.' 5 However, to ascertain such activities would seem to re-
quire resort to the old categories of governmental or proprietory, traditional
or unusual functions of the state. In effect, this "non-discriminatory test"
seems merely to place these old criteria "in a new container." 11 Since all but
two members of the Court viewed Justice Frankfurter's test in this light,"7
there is reason to doubt that the test will long survive.
Secondly, the "direct tax-indirect tax" test, which has been used to in-
validate state taxes levied directly on a federal instrumentality,"3 appears
not to apply to the reverse situation of federal taxation of state instrumen-
talities. The instant case is one of a series involving direct federal taxation
of a state enterprise where the test was not used.19 This lack of reciprocity
subjects state enterprises to taxation which would not be allowed against
similar federal ventures.
Thirdly, the "economic burden" test, which early became a part of the
doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity ' and which wams herein es-
poused by the late Chief Justice and the plurality of the court, seems still to
(1928); United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U. S. 174 (1944). Congrezs may by statute
permit direct taxation of a federal instrumentality, but unless the tax is levied on a Eubject
specifically taxable it will be invalid. Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314
U. S. 95 (1941).
14. State of New York v. United States, 66 Sup. Ct. 310,314 (U.S. 1946).
15. "There are, of course, State activities and State-ovmed property that partake of
uniqueness from the point of view of intergovernmental relations.... These could not ba
included for purposes of federal taxation in any abstract category of taxpayers vithout
taxing the State as a State." Ibid.
16. Justices Douglas and Black dissenting. Id. at 319.
17. Id. at 316, 319.
18. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134 (1937) (gros receipts tax on inde-
pendent contractor working for federal government -alid as only indirect tax on govern-
ment); State of Alabama v. King and Boozer, 314 U. S. 10, 140 A. L. R. 615, 621 (1941)
(sales tax on purchases of materials by a contractor for the federal government, held valid as
indirect tax on the government); United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U. S. 174 (1944)
(state tax directly on government ovmed property, held invalid); Mayo v. U. S., 319 U. S.
441 (1943) (inspection fees laid directly upon the United States held invalid).
19. See note 7 supra.
20. Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S.
216 (1931); Graves v. New York e rd. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466 (1939).
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be in good standing as applied to federal taxation of state instrumentalities.2
By this test, as initially formulated, a showing of an economic burden "real,
not imaginary; substantial, not negligible" 22 passed on to the complaining
government was required to invalidate the tax. Using this criterion, income
taxes on government officials, 23 a capital gains tax on the sale of government
bonds,24 an excise tax on gasoline sold to a government contractor,26 and a
tax on the income of lessees of government oil lands 26 were upheld. In at
least two cases indirect taxes were invalidated upon satisfactory proof of a
burden.Y In the instant case, the tax was a direct tax on the State of New
York and pro tanto a clear burden. But the late Chief Justice indicated that
proof of a burden will not suffice, unless the burden unduly interferes with
the performance of governmental duties. Thus the plurality upheld the tax
because "the activity taxed is such that its taxation does not unduly impair
the State's functions of government." 2
Finally, the late Chief Justice warned that the line on tax immunity ques-
tions must be drawn with an eye to preserving the national taxing power.
If the subject of taxation is one which has been traditionally within that
taxing power, granting immunity because the subject is now owned or oper-
ated by the state will tend to limit the reach of the federal fisc.2 With this
criterion, the characteristics of the state enterprises are more important than
the function it serves. If the enterprise is of a business nature, granting tax
immunity would certainly withdraw a traditional subject from the field of
federal taxation and hence impair the federal government's taxing power.30
The net effect of the Saratoga Springs case is to limit severely state im-
21. The test has been specifically renounced as applied to state taxation of federal in-
strumentalities. United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U. S. 174, 189 (1944).
22. See Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 234 (1931).
23. Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304
U. S. 405 (1938); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466 (1939).
24. Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216 (1931).
25. Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 466 (1934).
26. Helvering v. Mt.'Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376 (1938); Accord: Helvering v.
Bankline Oil Co., 303 U. S. 362 (1938).
27. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 56 A. L. R. 583, 587
(1928) (excise tax on gasoline collected from seller held bad as to gasoline sold to govern-
ment); Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570 (1931) (manufacturers excise
on motorcycles sold to government held invalid). These two cases "have been distinguished
and must be deemed to be limited to their particular facts." James v. Dravo Contracting
Co., 302 U. S. 134, 151 (1937).
28. State of New York v. United States, 66 Sup. Ct. 310, 317 (U. S. 1946).
29. Ibid.
30. This approach is a continuation of the rationale used in Allen v. Regents, 304 U. S.
439, 451 (1938), "In final analysis the question we must decide is whether, by electing to
support a governmental activity through conduct of a business comparable in all essentials
to those usually conducted by private owners, a State may withdraw the business from the
field of federal taxation." The old governmental-proprietary test which looked to the nature




munity from federal taxation, because only by showing that a tax unduly
interferes with the performance of its sovereign duties can a state avoid the
impost. It is this limitation of immunity which Justices Douglas and Black
attack in their dissent. They advocate a return to the doctrine of absolute
intergovernmental tax immunity. 3' On the legal level their argument relies
upon the states' sovereignty as guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment and
the anomaly of allowing one sovereign government to tax another.32 The
force of the argument, however, is directed at the economic significance of
the majority decision. No matter what test is adopted, any taxation of gov-
ernmental activities is pro tanto a hindrance to that government in the exe-
cution of its functions, and with the tax immunity scales now weighed in
favor of the federal government, "the economic ability of the federal gov-
ernment to expand its activities at the expense of the states, is at once ap-
parent." 33 With many states contemplating programs in housing, Eoil and
forest conservation, water resources control and the like,3 4 the question of
federal taxation is vital. Congress might not only decline to undertake such
projects itself, but could conceivably hamper state projects by taxation. 5
The dissent appears to be aimed at restricting the federal government's
power to restrain new economic ventures of state and local governments.
However, in view of other factors bearing on intergovernmental fiscal
relations, there are limits to the extent to which the Supreme Court can act
as an effective catalyst for expanding state functions if Congress balks at
such expansion. By immunizing its own instrumentalities -3 and by cutting
down payments to the states in lieu of taxes on government enclaves,#
the federal government could limit the financial resources of the states m
thereby indirectly restricting their activities.
31. State of New York v. United States, 66 Sup. Ct. 310, 318 (U.S. 1946).
32. Id. at 321.
33. Id. at 320.
34. For articles discussing the variant activities which are being contemplated by the
various states as part of their post-v.-ar programs, consult the monthly issues of (1943-5)
STATE GOVERNmENT; (1942-3) PLANNING & CIvic COMMENT.
35. "Mlany state activities are in marginal enterprises where private capital refuse to
venture. Add to the cost of these projects a federal tax and the Eocialprogram maybe de-
stroyed before it can be launched." Justice Douglas dis enting in State of Neew York v.
United States, 66 Sup. Ct. 310, 319 (U. S. 1946); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 3 Wall. 533 (U. S.
1869) (10% federal tax on state bank notes drove them out of existence).
36. See note 8 supra.
37. For data on these payments see Report on Federal Contributions to States and Local
Government Units With Respect Federally Owned Real Estate, H. R. Doc. No. 216, 78th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1943). As of June 30, 1937, it was estimated that total Federal real estate hold-
ings (including public domain) were 375,000,000 acres or 20.77 of the total area of the
country. Estimated assessed value was $3,283,000,000. Federal State and Local Go-ernrtent
Fiscal Relations. SEN. Doc. 69, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 279. No reliable figures are
available on all payments made to the States and localities under the various laws, but pay-
ments in 1941 were estimated at $8,500,000. Id. at 283.
38. For an exhaustive study of the chaotic tax structure now operative in the United
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However, the dissent does focus attention on the crux of the matter-how
much encouragement is to be given to governmental undertakings. Certain
state or federal enterprises may be so affected with the public interest that
they warrant the subsidy of tax immunity. If this is the central issue, the
tax should be considered primarily in terms of the social and economic ques-
tions involved rather than in terms of a conflict of sovereignty. Under
existing statutes, state or municipally owned public utilities are immune
from the federal income tax.39 If other state activities similarly connected
with the public interest or uniquely adapted to operation by a governmental
unit seek immunity from taxation, the answer should depend on a reasoned
analysis of their nature and relation to the public. Where intergovernmental
taxation is allowed, the rules should be equal and reciprocal between the
states and the federal government. 0 Then, with taxes borne equally by
state, federal and private enterprises of like nature, some measure of the
efficiency of each might be obtained. Forthright recognition of these eco-
nomic factors which are at the base of all tax immunity problems would do
much to clear the air of the logic-chopping which has been characteristic of
decisions to date.
SCOPE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-
ALTHOUGH provisions for summary judgment exist in many jurisdictions,
the present Federal Rules are the first to make the procedure available to
both parties in all civil actions.' Under Rule 56 a district court, on the
motion of either party, may be called upon to render judgment before trial
if there is no genuine issue of material fact remaining in dispute between the
parties. In arriving at its decision it may look beyond the pleadings and
States, see Federal State & Local Government Fiscal Relations. SEN. Doc. 69, 78th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1943). For data on the archaic forms of taxation now left to the local governing
units see id. at 8-12.
39. INT. REv. CODE § 116(d) (1939).
40. See Powell, supra note 2 at 804.
* Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F. (2d) 464 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
1. Advisory Committee's note to Rule 56, FED. RuLEs Cxv. PROC., 28 U. S. C. follow-
ing § 723c (1940). The Rules were made applicable to copyright actions in 1939 by amend-
ment to copyright rule 1, 17 U. S. C. following § 25 (1940). See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
(1st ed. 1938) 3174-7 (hereinafter cited as 3 MOORE). For discussion of the earliest judicial
interpretations see Wheaton, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Interpreted (1939) 25 CORN.
L. Q. 28, 29. For an excellent brief historical survey and general discussion, with selected
bibliography, see Clark, Summary Judgments (1941) JUD. ADMIN. MONoOmrsHs, Ser. A,
No. 5, reprinted (1943) 2 F. R. D. 364.
[Vol. 55
consider evidence introduced by way of depositions, admissions, and affi-
davits.2
The courts, in applying Rule 56, must make a policy determination
between the desirable aim of concluding litigation swiftly and without undue
expense, and that of according each party a full and fair hearing.3 Moreover
in each case the difficult problem is presented as to whether a "genuine issue
of material fact" exists within the meaning of the Rule.4 In reaching this
determination courts must decide whether pleading a fact, without showing
the existence of supporting evidence, raises that fact in issue.5 In addition
the extent to which the resisting party must disclose his case 0 and the weight
to be accorded presumptions or inferences in his favor 7 must be considered.
The conflict between two fundamentally opposed theories of the scope of
the summary judgment is represented by the opinions of a divided Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in the recent case of Arnstein v. Porter.8 In a suit
between two songwriters 9 for infringement of copyrights to musical corn-
2. "... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depsi-
tions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that, e.icept as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), FED. RULES Civ. PRnc. The
right to introduce evidence advances the procedure beyond the motion to dismiss the com-
plaint, and permits a party to discredit his opponent's pleadings, although on their face
satisfactory. See 3 Mooan § 56.03.
3. Rule 1, FED. RULES Cv. PROC., reads in part: "[The Rules] shall be construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Therefore, Rule 56
should be considered in its setting as a part of the general scheme of the new procedure. For
discussion see 3 MooRE § 56.01; HOLTZOFF, NEW FEDERAL PROCEDURE AND THE CoLMnrS
(1940) 143; Ford, More Expeditious Delerninat ion of .4dions Under Il: cNe'w Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (1939) 1 F. R. D. 223; Clark, Simplified Picading (1942) JtUD. ADmu. MO!;O-
GRAPHS, Ser. A, No. 18.
4. Courts have varied somewhat in their interpretation of the "fact" phrase. Sze 3
MooRE (1st ed. 1938 and Supp. 1945) § 56.04. Commentary, "Genurneness" of Issues or
Summary Judgment (1941) 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 940.
5. See Lindsey v. Leavy, 149 F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A. 9th, 1945); Williams v. Kolb, 145
F. (2d) 344 (App. D. C. 1944); Pen-Ken Gas & Oil Corp. v. Warfield Natural Gas Co., 137
F. (2d) 871 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943); Piantadosi v. Loew's, Inc., 137 F. (2d) 534 (C. C. A. 9th,
1943); Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F. (2d) 305 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940); Port of Palm Beach Dist.
v. Goethals, 104 F. (2d) 706 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
6. See Madeirense do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Emricl: Lumber Co., 147 F. (2d) 399
(C. C. A. 2d, 1945) (compare majority opinion with dissent); Nahtel Corp. v. West Virginia
Pulp & Paper Co., 141 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F. (2d)
469 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943); U. S. ex re. Ryan v. Broderick, 59 F. Supp. 189 (D. KIan. 1945).
7. See Wittlin v. Giacalone, 154 F. (2d) 20 (App. D. C. 1946); Firemen's Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Aponaug Mfg. Co., 149 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945); Yorl: v. Guaranty
Trust Co. of N. Y., 143 F. (2d) 503 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); Clair v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 34
F. Supp. 559 (XV. D. Mo. 1940).
8. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F. (2d) 464 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
9, This is the sixth suit for plagiarism brought by composer Arnstein, each against a
different defendant. The other five cases, the first of which wa.s decided in 1933, went to
trial and were determined to be without merit. Arnstein v. Broadcast Music Inc., 137 F.
(2d) 410 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943); Arnstein v. Marks Music Corp., 82 F. (2d) 275 (C. C. A. 2d,
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positions 10 plaintiff, Arnstein, alleged that there were specific similarities
between Cole Porter's songs and his own, that Porter or his agents had stolen
manuscripts from Arnstein's rooms, and that Arnstein's works had been
widely distributed and played over the radio. Recordings of the pertinent
pieces were presented in evidence. But in a deposition Arnstein revealed
that he had no direct evidence either to connect Porter with the alleged
robbery, or to prove that he had seen or heard any of Arnstein's works; and
Cole Porter in a deposition categorically denied any access or copying. On
these facts the district court granted defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment," but this decision was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals,
Judge Clark dissenting.1
2
Under the substantive law of plagiarism, copying can be inferred either
from striking similarities between the works, or from lesser similarities ius
proof of defendant's access to them. 3 In the instant case both opinions
agreed that the similarities between the songs were not striking, but the
majority held them sufficient to support a finding of copying if access were
proved; and they maintained that plaintiff had raised a genuine issue on that
point, although he had shown only a possibility of having evidence to sup-
port it. Defendant's denial was held inconclusive, his credibility being a
question of fact for determination by a jury.
The gravamen of this theory of summary judgment is that to resist the
motion a party need not produce his evidence, but need only indicate that
it is possible that such evidence may be available. 14 The effect in plagiarism
actions is virtually to eliminate the possibility of avoiding trial." For slight
1936); Arnstein v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 52 F. Supp. 114 (S. D. N. Y. 1943);
Arnstein v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 29 F. Supp. 388
(S. D. N. Y. 1939); Arnstein v. Nathaniel Shilkret, U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. N. Y., Opinion
No. 8152, Dec. 20, 1933.
10. The suit also charged infringement of plaintiff's rights to uncopyrighted musical
compositions, and wrongful use of the titles of others. The court held that these charges
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, being non-federal causes of action.
11. Arnstein v. Porter, U.S. Dist. Ct., S. D. N.Y., Opinion No. 16036, July 26, 1945.
12. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F. (2d) 464 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946), with the majority opinion
by Judge Frank.
13. See discussion in both opinions in the instant case and cases cited therein. 154 F.
(2d) 464, 468, 475 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
14. For previous statements of this thesis, see Judge Frank's opinion in Doehler Metal
Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F. (2d) 130 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945), and his dissent in Ma-
deirense do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., 147 F. (2d) 399, 405 (C. C. A. 2d,
1945) where he said: "My colleagues' basic reason for their decision appears to be this: The
seller should have disclosed in his affidavits any evidence it had which bore on the question
of market price; its silence should therefore be penalized. . . . I see no reason for springing
on the seller here an indirect method, no excuse for employing a threat of summary judg-
ment as a sort of rack or thumb-screw to bring about disclosure of evidence." Id. at 407.
Compare Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F. (2d) 305 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940).
15. Judge Frank recognized this when he said in the instant case: "Until the Supreme
Court tells us that we err, we shall therefore adhere .. . to our belief .. . that generally
there should be trials in plagiarism suits." 154 F. (2d) 464, 474 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946). As an
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similarities are easily shown, and, if a mere allegation of access is then
sufficient to raise the fact of copying in issue, the motion for summary judg-
ment is reduced in effectiveness to a motion to dismiss the complaint,"0 which
the Second Circuit has generally overruled in these suits.17 This result seems
to deny that the summary judgment procedure instituted by the Federal
Rules added anything to existing practice.
In his dissent, however, Judge Clark would give vitality to the summary
judgment by requiring proof of the existence of evidence to resist the motion.
Thus, in the present situation, the mere allegation of access, without evi-
dence to contest defendant's denial, would not raise an issue of fact to be
tried.18 Although admitting that the court is not to weigh material evidence
example of a case in which summary judgment might be proper, Judge Frank suppozed a
suit wherein Ravel's "Bolero" was alleged to infringe "Men Irish Eyes Are Smiling"; but
such an action is without the realm of probability. There is no precedent for summary
judgment in a suit turning on the infringement of a musical copyright. Compare Piantadosi
v. Loew's, Inc., 137 F. (2d) 534 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943), where the court affirmed a summary
judgment for defendant on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to establish clear title to
the copyright of the song involved. But summary judgment has been granted in a suit for
plagiarism of a literary copyright. See Rose v. Connelly, 38 F. Supp. 54 (S. D. N. Y. 1941);
cf. Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 113 F. (2d) 627 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940). In
suits for the infringement of patents the motion has frequently been granted, although there
is dicta adverse to the practice. See Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 57 F. Supp. 825 (E. D. Mich.
1944); Allen v. Radio Corp. of America, 47 F. Supp. 244 (D. Del. 1942); Millburn Mills,
Inc. v. Meister, 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 741 (S. D. N. Y. 1940). Conlra: E. IN. Blis Co. v. Cold
Metal Process Co., 47 F. Supp. 897 (N. D. Ohio 1942); Lip Lure, Inc. v. Bloomingdale Bro.,
Inc., 30 F. Supp. 38 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) (trade mark); Refractolite Corp. v. Prismo Holding
Corp., 25 F. Supp. 965 (S. D. N. Y. 1933). See 3 MooRE (Supp. 1945) 1S0-1.
16. It is conceivable that instead of merely denying access, the defendant could thor:
conclusively that access by him was impossible, but it is difficult to imagine the circum-
stances of such a case.
17. McDonald v. Du Maurier, 144 F. (2d) 696 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); Dellar v. Samuel
Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F. (2d) 661 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939). In earlier practice the motion v,-as czca-
sionally granted, but the appellate court indicated that it did not favor the procedure.
Shipman v. R. K. 0. Radio Pictures Inc., 100 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). But see
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F. (2d) 119, 123 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
18. A second reason for Judge Clark's dissent was his disagreement on the is ue of un-
lawful use. He thought the alleged similarities too petty to constitute plagiarism, thua
rendering moot the question of access. A large part of both opinions is devoted to considera-
tion of the law of plagiarism. 154 F. (2d) 464 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946). For a further disagre-
ment between Judge Clark and Judge Frank in this matter, compare their opinions in the
subsequent case of Emery Hein v. Universal Pictures Co., C. C. A. 2d, Opinion No. 20067,
Feb. 16, 1946. There, surprisingly, Judge Frank, writing for the court, affirmed a motion
to dismiss after trial on the ground that while plaintiff's copyright might have been valid,
he had shown no unlawful use. Judge Clark concurred in the result, caying that while the
copying would clearly have been illegal, the plaintiff had failed to establish a good copy-
right in this country. And he added: "That results at once so divergent and fo mu:ically
astonishing as the decisions in these two cases can occur simultaneously I can attribute only
to the novel conception of legal plagiarism first announced in the Arnstarn ca-e and nov
repeated here."
19461
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
or pass on the credibility of witnesses, 9 Judge Clark would hold insufficient
the raising of a mere suspicion, 20 or a showing that it is possible that evidence
might be produced."'
Although the Supreme Court has only twice considered Rule 56 in detail, 22
the trend appears to be towards broadening the scope of the summary judg-
ment. In 1944 in the leading case of Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corpora-
tion 23 the majority opinion seemingly approved a strict construction of the
Rule. 24 However in Griffin v. Griffin,2 1 decided subsequently to the Arnst-in
case, while refusing a summary judgment for reasons of substantive law,20
the Court apparently indicated a willingness to require that a party show
evidence to sustain his allegations. The Court therein rejected a pleaded
19. Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F. (2d) 344 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942); McElwain v.
Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 126 F. (2d) 210 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
20. See Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank of N. Y., 114 F. (2d) 438, 446
(C. C. A. 2d, 1940): "Plaintiff relies on three circumstances .... The first two are relied
upon as circumstances of suspicion. . . . However much these might be matters affording
clues for investigation by the secret police of an interested nation, of themselves they do not
rise to the dignity of competent proof of any sort. .. ."
21. See Madeirense do Brasil S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., 147 F. (2d) 399,
405 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945) ("the ruling is to be made on the record the parties have'actually
presented, not on one potentially possible"); Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F. (2d) 469,
473 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943) ("If one may thus reserve one's evidence when faced with a motion
for summary judgment there would be little opportunity 'to pierce the allegations of fact in
the pleadings' or to determine that the issues formally raised were in fact sham or otherwise
unsubstantial. . . . So easy a method of rendering useless the very valuable remedy of
summary judgment is not suggested in any part of its history or in any one of the applicable
decisions."); Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F. (2d) 675 (C. C. A.
2d, 1940). Compare note 14 supra. For a more complete expression of his views, see Clark,
Summary Judgments (1941) and Simplified Pleading (1942) Jun. ADm.N. MONOGRAPIIS,
Ser. A, Nos. 5 and 18.
22. For cases applying Rule 56 with little discussion, see Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley,
325 U. S. 711 (1945); Arenas v. United States, 322 U. S. 419 (1944) (both reversing the judg-
ment); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1 (1945); Milcor Steel Co. v. George A.
Fuller Co., 316 U. S. 143 (1942); Morton Salt Co. v. Suppliger Co., 314 U. S. 488 (1941)
(all affirming the judgment). In analyzing appellate court decisions it should be kept in
mind that generally only the granting of a summary judgment is reviewable by them. Hence
the Supreme Court can probably never reverse a circuit court for denying a motion for
summary judgment.
23. 321 U. S. 620 (1944).
24. Id. at 623, 627-9. For comment on this decision see 3 MOORE (Supp. 1945) 186, n. 1;
ILSEN, FEDERAL RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (rev. ed. 1944) 248; Commentary, Summary
Judgment as to Damages (1944) 7 Fed. Rutles Serv. 974. See also Amendment to Rule 56(c)
proposed by the Advisory Committee, Second Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments
to Rules of Civil Procedure, May, 1945, pp. 64-5.
25. 14U.S.L.WEEK4217 (U.S. 1946).
26. The case hinged on the question of the faith and credit due in the District Court for
the District of Columbia to a judgment previously obtained in New York. The majority
held the New York judgment void for want of due process, and reversed on that ground,
Three members of the Court, holding the New York judgment valid in view of lack of any
evidence that it should be modified, were of the opinion that the summary judgment should
be affirmed. 14 U. S. L. WEEK 4217,4220-4 (U. S. 1946).
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claim which was based solely upon "petitioner's unsupported suspicions." 2
In view of the liberalizing intent of the Rules, with their great emphasis
on pre-trial discovery and the elimination of unnecessary litigation, it is to
be hoped that the implications found in the majority opinion in the Gr(fin
case will be interpreted as sanctioning the more flexible interpretation of
Rule 56. Otherwise, if the limited theory of the majority in the Arnstein, case
is extended beyond plagiarism actions, the procedure will be reduced in
stature to little more than the old demurrer.
THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT VERSUS THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE*
AGAIN the Supreme Court has considered the effect of the Twenty-first
Amendment 1 upon the distribution between federal and state governments
of the power to regulate intoxicating liquors, and once again, in United
States v. Frankfort Distilleries,2 the court has uttered an opinion which fails
to delimit with clarity their respective spheres of authority. The judicial
controversy involves the construction of Section Two of the Amendment
which provides that "The transportation or importation into any State,
Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
The instant case was a Sherman Act anti-trust prosecution, in which
defendant wholesalers, producers and retailers argued, by way of defense,
that Section Two destroyed Congress' prior power to control interstate
commerce in intoxicating liquors and that, consequently, the Sherman Act
could not affect them. Rejecting this defense, Mr. Justice Black asserted
that the states had not been endowed with exclusive power over the inter-
state commerce in liquors, and that a federal anti-trust prosecution might
therefore be maintained. By way of a caveat, he emphasized that this case
did not present a conflict between state and federal power inasmuch as the
state government concerned had not sanctioned the particular price-mainte-
nance agreements. So the question of which authority over liquor traffic was
supreme -as specifically left open.
27. An alternative ground advanced by petitioner for reversal wass that the New York
judgment had been obtained by fraud. 14 U. S. L. VEsa 4217, 4220 (U. S. 1946). The
author of the majority opinion vas the late Air. Chief Justice Stone, who vote a strong
dissent to the majority's interpretation of Rule 56 in Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp.,
321 U. S. 620, 629 (1944).
-United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U. S. 293 (1945).
1. U.S. CoNsT. AmEND. XXI.
2. 324 U. S. 293 (1945), hereafter referred to as the Franhforl Disillctes cae. The
late Chief Justice took no part in the decision.
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As a basis for future prediction, Justice Black's caveat is conducive of at
least a dual interpretation. Conceivably, it is a warning that the Court, still
entangled in the "unpurposive verbalism" 3 of its early decisions under the
Twenty-first Amendment, will continue to uphold all state liquor legislation
against all federal constitutional objections. 4 More plausibly, the caveat may
herald an intention to re-examine the entire problem of liquor regulation
when it squarely arises.in issue and to substitute an intelligible formula for
the present legal chaos. This redefinition might be grounded on the concep-
tion that state liquor legislation escapes the interdict of the Commerce
Clause and other constitutional limitations only when representing a valid
exercise of state police power. 5 Such a restriction of state authority seems
clearly justified by the language of Section Two and by the specific intent
of the Amendment as a whole as discernible from the Congressional Record
and from the peculiar antecedent history of liquor regulation in the United
States.
The language of Section Two does not purport to grant to the states a
plenary power unrestricted by pre-existing constitutional limitations. True,
it prohibits the transportation and importation of liquors into a state in
violation of "the laws thereof," but it would not require boldness beyond
the capacity of the Supreme Court to interpolate the word "proper" to
modify "laws." This interpolation is supported by the canon that a con-
struction which raises a conflict between parts of a constitution is inad-
missible when, by reasonable interpretation, the parts may be made to
harmonize.6 In other cases the Courts have freely implied similar limitations
to seemingly all-embracing language in order to effectuate the purpose of an
amendmentY
If the Twenty-first Amendment be examined in its historical matrix, no
intent to vest an unlimited jurisdiction in the states is discernible. The sole
3. See note 19infra.
4. Compare Mr. Justice Black concurring in Carter v. Virginia, 321 U. S. 131, 138
(1944). "Though the precise amount of power it [The Twenty-first Amendment] has left in
Congress to regulate liquor under the Commerce Clause has not been marked out by deci-
sions, this much is settled: local, not national, regulation of the liquor traffic is now the
general Constitutional policy"; see the vigorous defense of "States' Rights" by Justices
Douglas and Black dissenting in State of New York v. United States, 66 Sup. Ct. 310, 318
(U. S. 1946).
5. The New York Milk Control Act was invalidated on precisely this type of police
power rationale. "Neither the power to tax nor the police power may be used by the state of
destination with the aim and effect of establishing an economic barrier against competition
with the products of another state or the labor of its residents." Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig,
294 U. S. 511,527 (1935).
6. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 (1920); Fiske v. State of Missouri, 62 F. (2d)
150 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933).
7. In interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has legalized
various forms of involuntary servitude despite the all-inclusive nature of the language em-
ployed in the Amendment. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918); Butler v.
Perry, 240 U. S. 328 (1916); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275 (1897).
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function of Section Two was to render an iron-clad protection to the "dry
states" against any possible influx of intoxicants from non-prohibition areas.8
This purpose was to be achieved by transplanting into the Constitution pre-
existing legislation: the Webb-Kenyon Act.9 Prior to the enactment of the
Webb-Kenyon Act, a Supreme Court decision had established the principle
that liquor arriving in a state in its original package was still in interstate
commerce and therefore immune from the control of state police power.10
Construing an explicit Congressional response to this ruling, which provided
that state authority might commence upon the "arrival" of an original
package within a state, the Court held that "arrival" meant "delivery to the
consignee" and that the transaction was in interstate commerce up to the
time of delivery.1 ' A later case sustained the right of an individual in a dry
state to receive liquor for his own personal use without state interference. 12
This judicial frustration of state prohibition produced the Webb-Kenyon
Act which divested liquor of its interstate character and prohibited the
traffic of intoxicants into states in violation of "any laws thereof."
The title of the Act divested liquor of its interstate character "in certain
cases"; the courts proceeded to define the exceptions while at the same time
emphasizing the continuing existence of federal power to regulate. It was
successively reiterated that only uses specifically forbidden by state law
were prohibited," that interference with interstate commerce was per-
missible only in the exercise of valid state police power, 14 and that discrimi-
natory state statutes did not represent proper exercises of such power.15
3. See HAmILTON, PRICE AND PRICE POLICIES (1938) 426; Byce, Alcooic Brrar!Ce
Control Before Repeai (1940) 7 Law & Co,,xmep. PaoB. 544, 567; (1939) 7 GEo. V:As. L.
RIv. 402, 407; (1939) 37 Mica. L. REv. 957, 959; (1937) 25 CALIF. L. rEv. 718, 725. This
was likewise the sole intent obser-able in the individual state conventions. See Bnowz;,
RATIFICATION OF THE TwETY-FIRsT AUMEDMMXENT To TrlE CoN; sTIrUo (1933) ps sis.
Legal and non-legal climate of opinion at the time of the ratification of the Amendment con-
curred in this view. Brief for Appellants, App. B., Finch and Co. v. MclIttrick, 305 U. S
395 (1939).
9. 37 STAT. 699 (1913), 27 U. S. C. § 122 (1940).
10. Leisyv.Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
11. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412 (1398) interpreting the \'rilson Act, 26 STAT. 313
(1890), 27 U. S. C. § 121 (1940).
12. Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U. S. 190 (1915).
13. Adams Express Co. v. Commonwealth, 154 Ky. 462, 157 S. NV. 908 (1913); Van
Winkle v. State, 4 Boyce (Del.) 578,91 Ad. 385 (1914); Palmer v. So. Exprezs Co., 129 Tenn.
116, 165 S. XV. 236 (1914); F-v pare Peede, 75 TexCr. 247, 170 S. IV. 749 (1914); Common-
wealth v. White, 166 Ky. 528, 179 S. IV. 469 (1915); see Rogers, State Lgislotior. Urder the
Webb-Kenyon Act (1915) 2S HARv. L. Ruv. 225, 235.
14. Palmer v. So. Express Co., 129 Tenn. 116, 165 S. I. 236 (1914); eec Rogers, supra
note 13, at 231; Notes (1936) 21 Comzu. L. Q. 504, 506; (1937) 23 VA. L. Rnv. 338,339. For a
compilation of decisions sustaining particular state statutes as valid exercets of police
power, see Comment (1937) 25 C.%Li. L. REv. 718, 721-22.
15. The XVrlson Act specifically forbade discriminatory state legislation. Scott v.
Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 101 (1897); Vance v. NV. A. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438, 444 (1893).
Although the Webb-Kenyon Act did not explicitly bar such statutes, the courts declared
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With reference to interstate commerce, the rule was concisely set forth in
these terms: "It (Congress) may exercise its authority, as in the Wilson and
Webb-Kenyon Acts, having in view the laws of the State, but it has a power
of its own, which in this instance it has exerted in accordance with its view
of public policy." 16
Section Two of the Amendment was drafted to base this equilibrium
between state and federal authority unshakenly and endurably on the Con-
stitution. In Senator Bingham's words, it was but a "restatement of the
Webb-Kenyon law, already on the law books, which would write into the
Constitution the right of the dry states to have federal protection against
the importation of liquor." 17 But in the first case to interpret the Amend-
ment, State Board v. Young's Market Company,'8 the Court refused to con-
strue Section Two in the light of this intent and historical background, and,
contending that the language of the Amendment granted states plenary
power, upheld an otherwise invalid state license tax upon importers of beer
from another state."
Repudiation, as a standard of interpretation, of the Webb-Kenyon Act
with its judicially defined notion of a concurrent federal and state authority
and its conception that only "proper" exercises of the state police power
were constitutional was unwarranted and also unnecessary: the result
might have been obtained more satisfactorily by considering the statute
that the phrase "any laws" meant merely "proper laws." Brennen v. So. Express Co., 106
S. C. 102, 109, 90 S. E. 402, 404 (1916); Monumental Brewing Co. v. Whitlock, 111 S. C.
198, 97 S. E. 56 (1918); see Dugan v. Bridges, 16 F. Supp. 694, 707 (D. N. H. 1936); Mc-
Govney, The Webb-Kenyon Law and Beyond (1917) 3 IowA L. BULL. 145, 155; Note (1936)
21 CORe. L. Q. 504, 509.
16. United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420,427 (1919); United States v. Simpson, 252 U. S,
465 (1920); People v. Keeley, 213 Mich. 115, 181 N. W. 990 (1921).
17. 76 CONG. REc. 4228 (1933); Senator Blaine id. at 4140-41; Senator Borah id. at
4170-72; Senator Walsh id. at 4176, 4219; Mr. Gibson id. at 4526; Senator Fletcher id.
at 4001; see Carr, Liquor and the Constitution (1940) 7 LAw & CONTEMI, PROD. 709, 710;
De Ganahl, The Scope of Federal Power Over Alcoholic Beverages Since The Twenly-First
Amendment (1940) 8 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 819, 822; Kallenbach, Interstate Commerce in
Intoxicating Liquors Under The Twenty-First Amendment (1940) 14 TEmiP. L. Q. 474, 476;
Legis. (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 644, 645.
18. 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
19. The Court conceded that prior to the enactment of the Amendment this tax would
have been invalid as a burden on interstate commerce but commented "As we think the
language of the Amendment is clear, we.do not discuss these matters." Id. at 63-4. See
caustic criticism in HAmiLToN, PRICE AND PRICE PoLIcIEs (1938) 425. ". . . the opinion
overlooks intent, which alone can give meaning to language, reverts to an unpurposive ver-
balism, and with complete unawareness slides across the plain boundary from the protection
of public morals into the promotion of local interest." Id. at 426. Shortly afterwards, the
Court took the next step. "We are asked to limit the power conferred by the Amendment so
that only those importations may be forbidden which, in the opinion of the Court, violate a
reasonable regulation of the liquor traffic. To do so would . . . 'involve not a construction




under question a proper police regulation based on a reasonable classifica-
tion.20 Had the Court so held, it would have been free to strike down the
avowedly retaliatory state legislation which later faced it.21 Perhaps the
Court's refusal to examine intent in this case 22 is traceable to the peculiar
moral, social, and sociological aspects of liquor itself. It may well have been
the moral attitude of certain justices which predisposed the Court to look
askance at efforts of the resuscitant liquor industry to escape regulation by
means of a liberal constitutional construction.
Among the legal difficulties occasioned by the rejection of the historical
interpretation are those suggested by the separate concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Frankfort Distilleries case. Reaching ahead
to the issue upon which Mr. Justice Black reserved decision, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter maintained that Section Two completely subordinated all
federal power under the Commerce Clause to the power of the states to
control liquor within their borders, and that federal legislation was valid
only where states failed to act. This proposition, that a state, by action or
inaction, may respectively bar or permit federal control over interstate
commerce, applies the much-criticized 2 "silence of Congress" doctrine 21 to
state legislatures.25 Should the Court read such a novel tenet into the Con-
stitution, it must prepare itself to analyze minutely all liquor regulations of
all states to determine in which areas federal legislation may take effect.
In practical result, the Court's failure, beginning with the Young's fardet
decision, to construe Section Two in its proper light further sanctions the
Balkanization of American trade, commerce and industry.0 Of the 1500
odd statutory trade barriers in effect today, more than 100 are tailored to
20. See Comment (1937) 25 C.AUF. L. REv. 718, 727; Legis (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 644,
667 n. 158.
21. Finch and Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U. S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Bre ing Co. v.
Liquor Comm., 305 U. S. 391 (1939).
22. Courts are clearly empowered to e.anine the intent of amendments and to con-
strue them in the light of their desired effect: Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245, 259-60 (1920);
Matter of Dowling, 219 N. Y. 44,56, 113 N. E. 545, S48 (1916).
23. "The 'psychoanalysis' of Congress is a perilous venture when that body spealm and
a hopeless task when it is silent. It would seem that the only sensible course is to hold that
when Congress says nothing it means what it says." Sholley, The Ngatlre Imp!ications of
the Commerce Clause (1936) 3 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 556, 588; see BikMd, Tbe Silence of Congress
(1927) 41 HRv. L. Rnv. 200; Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Powr (1940) 27 VA. L.
REv. 1, 19-28.
24. An eaiaustive collation of cases dealing with Congressional Silence and it effect
on state action may be found in GAVIT, TaE CO mMERCE CLAUSE (1932) App. D & E.
25. The adoption of such a reciprocal doctrine has been urged by several commentators.
See Collier, Judicial Bootstraps and the General Wdfare Clause (1936) 4 GEO. WVASu. L. R.v
211, 239-42; De Ganahl, supra note 17 at 885-94.
26. ir. Justice Jackson concurring in Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U. S. 390, 402
(1941). "I do not suppose the sides will fall if the Court does allow Arkansas to rig up thi3
handy device for policing liquor on the ground that it is not forbidden by the commerce
clause, but in so doing it adds another to the already too numerous and burdensome state
restraints of national commerce and pursues a trend with which I would have no part."
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protect domestic manufacturers and distillers of liquor against the vagaries
of the competitive market.' Comprehending the inadequacy of remedial
state action through reciprocal legislation and compacts,2 text writers have
suggested federal attacks on both private and statutory trade barriers by
use of the national fiscal powers,2 by application of the doctrine of "uncon-
stitutional conditions," 30 and by stringent enforcement of the federal anti-
trust laws. 3' Prior Supreme Court decisions have fomented interstate liquor
rivalry by giving judicial blessing to state mercantilism; 32 the Frankfurter
rationale would remove a prime federal regulatory weapon in the fight
against these barriers. And it would do so at the very time when state-
sanctioned price-stabilization agreements bid fair to become common in the
economic pattern of the liquor industry.
33
The Supreme Court has reversed a host of prior decisions which later
investigation indicated had been founded on an erroneous interpretation of
legislative intent.34 The Court is surely not foreclosed from re-examining
Section Two of the Twenty-first Amendment in the light of its antecedent
history in order that a sound basis may be found for future decisions, con-
cerning the liquor industry.
ENFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACTS WHICH VIOLATE THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT"'
THE Robinson-Patman Act,' designed to discourage monopoly by protect-
ing small independent enterprises,2 makes it unlawful to discriminate in
27. See Green, Liquor Trade Barriers (1940) 70 PuB. ADM. SERV. 1; Kallenbach, supra
note 17 at 482-3.
28. See Lindsay, Reciprocal Legislation (1910) 25 POL. SCI. Q. 435; Frankfurter and
Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments (1925)
34 YALE L. J. 685; but cf. Kallenbach, supra note 17 at 487; Skilton, State Power under the
Twenty-First Amendment (1938) 7 BROOK. L. REv. 342, 359.
29. See Hobbs, Federal Fiscal Powers and the Abatement of Trade Barriers (1941) 9 Gao.
WAsr. L. REv. 811.
30. See Carr, supra note 17 at 716; (1939) 37 MIcH. L. REv. 957, 960 n. 27.
31. See Schrimsher, The Use of the Federal Anti-Trust Laws to Combat Trade Barriers
(1941) 9 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 825.
32. "A return to mercantilism-an escape from which was by way of the Constitution-
is given the sanction of a document whose very purpose was 'to establish a more perfect
union.' " HAMILTON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 426.
33. For a comprehensive picture of the industrial pattern and price structure of liquor,
see HAMILTON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 416-20; 2 VERBATIAi REPORTS TNEC (1939) 430-
549; De Ganahl, Trade Practice and Price Control in the Alcoholic Beverage Industry (1940)
7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 665, 680.
34. Erie R. R. v. Tomkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
* Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 155 Fla. 877, 22 So. (2d) 461 (1945), aff'd
without opinion, 66 Sup. Ct. 527 (U. S. 1946), rehearing granted (1946) 14 U. S. L. WEEK 3322.
1. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1940). The Robinson-Patman Act is regarded
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price between purchasers of identical commodities, 3 and provides that
aggrieved parties may sue for treble damages 4 or to enjoin further dis-
crimination.5 The Act, however, leaves to judicial determination the legal
effect of contracts founded upon prohibited conductP The extent to which
a promisor can plead illegality under the Act as a defense to an action on a
discriminatory sales contract may be answered when the Supreme Court
decides the case of Bruce's Juices, Incorporated v. American Can Company.7
Action was instituted by the American Can Company in a Florida court
to collect four promissory notes executed for goods received by Bruce, one
of its smaller customers. The answer alleged that the Can Company, by
allowing customer discounts based upon volume of purchase,8 had violated
the Robinson-Patman Act and that the notes were, therefore, predicated
upon illegal consideration. After a pre-trial hearing, the court struck out
the defense of illegality and rendered judgment for the plaintiff," holding that
the notes represented a valid obligation, since the sales contract upon which
they were given -as not illegal on its face. This decision vas eventually 10
as an amendment to § 2 of the Clayton Act, which Act is considered a supplement to the
Sherman Act. For a general discussion of the interrelation of the three laws sEe Burns, The
Anti-Trust Laws and tMe Regulation of Price Compe ition (1937) 4 LAw & Co.,-ri. Pnon.
301.
2. The Act was drawn to curb the buying advantages of chain stores. Phillips, The
Robinson-l at man Anti-Price Discrimiuation Law and the Chain Store (1936) 15 H,%rv. Bus.
Rav. 62; Legis. (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 1285.
3. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a)(1940). But vendors may justify price
differences by showing they were given to meet competition, or were based on differences in
cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery.
4. 38 STAT. 730, 731 (1914), 15 U.S. C. § 15 (1940).
5. Injunction proceedings may be initiated privately in a federal court, 38 STAT. 730,
737 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 26 (1940); or by a federal district attorney in a federal court, 38
STAT. 730, 736-7 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 25 (1940). The Federal Trade Commizsion has the
power to issue cease and desist orders, enforceable by the Circuit Courts of Appeals. 38
ST-T. 730, 734-5 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 21 (1940).
6. In this respect the Robinson-Patman Act differs from the Sherman Act, vwhich
outlaws specifically all contracts which violate it. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1940).
This difference, however, was held not crucial in the first decision of the Florida Supreme
Court in the principal case. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 155 Fla. 877, 832,
22 So. (2d) 461, 463 (1944). See note 10 infra.
7. 66 Sup. Ct. 527 (U. S. 1946), rewaring granted (1946) 14 U. S. L. VEcr 3322.
8. These discounts ranged up to five percent. The instant appeal is not, however,
concerned with the substantive legality of the discounts since judgment was given on the
pleadings.
9. The defendant company objected to this summary procedure on the ground that
the pre-trial conference was authorized merely to simplify and not to determine the isue.
Brief for Appellant, pp. 30-1. See In re Petition of Jacksonville Bar Assoetation for Rule
Permitting the Establishment of Pre-Trial Procedure, 141 Fla. 327 (1940) (ordering pre-
trial hearings, when approved by individual circuit courts, for the purpose of simplifying
the issues). But ,f. Hillsborough County v. Sutton, 150 Fla. 601, S So. (2d) 401 (1942)
(the court may give judgment on the pleadings if the conference eliminates all questions of
fact).
10. Upon appeal, the Florida Supreme Court at first voted five to two for reversal,
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upheld by the United States Supreme Court without opinion in a four to four
decision," but the Court has approved Bruce's petition for reargument
before the full bench.'
2
The proliferation of doctrine concerning contracts which are void or
voidable, D malum prohibitum or malum in se, 14 "inherently" or "collaterally"
illegal,15 furnishes "authority" for both sides of the litigation. Both briefs
invoke these legalistic distinctions in their attempts to analogize from cases
arising under the Sherman Act, to which the Robinson-Patman Act is an
appendage." The Can Company relies on Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe
Company, 17 which held the validity of promissory notes unimpaired by
proof that the creditor-vendor was a combination in restraint of trade," A
contrary result, however, was reached in Continental Wallpaper Company v.
Voight and Sons,'" on the theory that the Connolly rule did not apply where
the statutory violation bore a "direct" relation to the contract in issue,20
Moreover, as the Court admitted extrinsic evidence to prove this relation-
ship,2' the Voight case undermines the Can Company's position that the de-
citing cases in which the defense had been allowed under the Sherman Act. 155 Fla. 877,
22 So. (2d) 461 (1944). But after rehearing, the Court voted four to three for affirmance of
the trial court, holding, without further elaboration, that the defense was unavailable
"under the facts submitted in evidence." Id. at 885, 22 So. (2d) at 465 (1945).
11. 66 Sup. Ct. 527 (U. S. 1946).
12. (1946) 14 U. S. L. WEEK 3322.
13. See ANSON, CONTRACTS (Corbin's ed. 1930) §§ 12-16, 263; RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS (1932) § 475b; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1937) § 1630 et seq.
14. The utility of this distinction has often been questioned. See Gellhorn, Contracts
and Public Policy (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 679, 683; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1938),
§ 1764.
15. See cases cited infra notes 18 and 20. For a discussion of this distinction see Wilder
Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Ref. Co., 236 U. S. 165, 171-78 (1915).
16. See note 1 supra.
17. 184 U. S. 540 (1902).
18. . Accord, Small Co. v. Lamborn & Co. 267 U. S. 248 (1925); Geddes v. Anaconda
Copper Mining. Co., 254 U. S. 590 (1921); Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Ref. Co., 236
U. S. 165 (1915). Cases holding that a vendee cannot avoid a contract merely because the
vendor is an unlawful trust are collected in 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1938) § 1661,
n. 4. See also ANSoN, CONTRACTS (Corbin's ed. 1930) § 253; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
(1932) § 597.
19. 212 U. S. 227 (1909). Dissenting, Justice Holmes found this case indistinguishable
from the Connolly case: "I think that this decision must mean that Connolly v. Union .Sewcr
Pipe Co. ought to have been decided the other way. . . . There was just as much of a
scheme and just the same scheme in that case as in this." Id. at 272.
20. Accord, Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U. S. 173 (1942); Bement & Sons v.
National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70 (1902); Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U. S. 255
(1897). See cases collected in 5 WiLLiSTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1938) § 1661, n. 5.
21. "The court will not be restricted to a partial statement of the facts but will consider
all the circumstances connected with the transaction so as to ascertain its real nature."
Continental Wallpaper Co. v. Voight & Sons Co., 212 U. S. 227, 266 (1909). Cf. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211, 245 (1899).
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fense is unavailable unless the misconduct shows on the face of the contract.
Thus, in the instant case, the vendor's discount policy and practice may be
examined to support the claim that the contract is an integral part of a
scheme condemned by the Act.
A somewhat more fruitful approach to the problem than that based solely
upon the traditional, conceptual distinctions has been to examine the pur-
poses of the antitrust acts 2' and to determine whether these objectives would
be furthered by an enlargement of the sanctions now provided. In this
regard, the institution of a contract defense of illegality based on one of
these acts would effectuate antitrust policy. Indeed, to reject such a defense
in the instant case would seem to give judicial backing to a forbidden agree-
ment, where the victim is of a class which the Robinson-Patman Act was
specifically designed to protect.23 Moreover, no reading of the Act or of the
proceedings which led to its passage 24 supports an inference that the enu-
merated penalties were intended to be exclusive. -5
A strict construction ' of statutory sanctions would seem particularly
unjustified in this case where effective relief is impossible under existing
jural remedies. Since Bruce now buys elsewhere, it would not benefit from
an injunction against further discriminatory conduct. And a suit for treble
damages, the only specified action permitting recovery for past injury, seems
inadvisable unless evidence garnered by the government in a suit of its own
22. See Gellhorn, supra note 14, at 691-3; Landis, Statudes and the Sources of Law, in
HARVARD LEGAL EssAYs (1934) 213. Cf. Harris v. Runnels, 12 How. 79 (U. S. 1351).
23. Traditionally, courts have been inclined to construe statutes in favor of their in-
tended beneficiaries where the legislative purpose has been to minimize discrepancies in
bargaining power. "Where contracts or transactions are prohibited by positive statutes, for
the sake of protecting one set of men from another set of men; the one, from their situation
and condition, being liable to be oppressed or imposed upon by the other; there, the parties
are not in pari dlicto; and in furtherance of these statutes, the person injured, after the
transaction is finished and completed, may bring his action and defeat the contract."
Browning v. Morris, 2 Cowp. 790,792, 9S Eng. Rep. 1364 (K. B. 1778) (per Lord' Mansfield).
See United States v. Post, 14S U. S. 124 (1893); Turney v. Tillman Co. 112 Ore. 122, 228
Pac. 933 (1924). But f. Hill v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 8 F. Supp. SO (W. D. La. 1933), (1935)
35 COL. L. REV. 297.
24. See Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 8443, H. M. 4995, H. R.
5062, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); H. R. RP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sees. (1936); SE!;.
RE'. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
25. Representative Wright Patman, co-author of the Act, has asked to enter the instant
case as amicus curiae on behalf of the defendant. In a memorandum in support of his peti-
tion, Patman says, "Such a denial [of the defense] seems to me to be contrary to the intent
of the Congress; to weaken the Act by taking away its most available remedy; to diminish
the protection against monopoly which the Act throws about small buinezs; and to impede
the antitrust policy which the Act was meant to instrument."
26. In one of the few cases in which the point raised by the principal ca-e has been liti-
gated previously, the court held that the Act was to be construed strictly because of it-
penal character. Progress Corp. v. Green, 163 Misc. 828 (Sup. Ct. 1937). This result is
criticized in (1933) 38 CoL. L. REv. 192.
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against the wrongdoer is available.Y Thus, the most immediate practical
method of relieving Bruce seems to be to vitiate the discriminatory contract
when the vendor seeks its enforcement.
Assuming Bruce's substantive argument prevails, the form of recovery
must be considered. The defendant's brief suggests theories both of complete
avoidance and counterclaim for damages. 2s Avoidance of the notes, however,
appears an illogical criterion of recovery, for their sum bears no demon-
strable relation to the amount of injury sustained. Furthermore, it seems
unreasonable to allow a vendee's counterclaim 0 which may be quantita-
tively penal beyond the intention of the Act. The most equitable adjust-
ment appears to be to allow the Can Company to recover the contract price
less the amount Bruce has paid in excess of its most favored competitor. 0
Thus, even though the contract is invalid, the vendor would be permitted
27. The Clayton Act makes such evidence available. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C.
§ 16 (1940). See ZORN AND FELDuAN, BusINEss UNDER THE NEW PRICE LAWS (1937) 250;
HAmILTON AND TILL, ANTITRUST IN ACTION (TNEC Monograph No. 16, 1940) 83.
28. "This question [of whether the defense is to be available] does not require the Court
to decide that the entire transaction is so tainted with illegality that the seller cannot collect
even the fair value of the goods, thus giving the buyer a windfall. The question can, of
course, be answered on the broad ground that a transaction unlawful under the Robinson-
Patman Act constitutes criminal conduct upon which no money judgment can be based.
"But if it be admitted that the buyer is entitled to the fair value of the goods, peti-
tioner's defense can be sustained on a narrower ground. It is that narrow ground which is
actually presented by the record. There is here, on the part of the respondent, no mere
demand for the fair value of its merchandise. Instead the record of the unfinished pre-trial
conference suggests the strong probability that petitioner has already paid the fair value
based on prices at which American Can Company sells to its larger competitors." Brief for
Appellant, p. 8. It is of interest that Bruce was represented by Thurman Arnold, ex-
Assistant Attorney General, and Chief of the Anti-trust Division of the Department of
Justice.
29. Jurisdictions which have adopted the English view that every contract involving
statutory violation is wholly unenforceable and void might allow such a claim. See Bartlett
v. Vinor, Carth. 251, 252, 90 Eng. Rep. 750 (K. B. 1692), Sturm v. Truby, 245 App. Div.
357, 282 N. Y. Supp. 433 (4th Dep't 193-5). Cf. Harriman v. Northern Securities Co., 197
U. S. 244, 295-6 (1905); Anderson, Quasi-Contractual Recovery in the Law of Sales (1937) 21
MINN. L. REv. 529, 565-66.
30. See 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1937) § 1485 and cases collected therein.
Use of surcharge as a measure of recovery, however, seems to have been discarded at one
stage in the Act's development. In discussing this mode of relief, the Senate Committee
said, "The measure of damages provided in section (d) is the amount of the forbidden dis-
crimination or allowance found to have been granted, limited however to the volume of the
plaintiff's business in the goods concerned, or to the amount which he would have received
had the allowance been granted to all on the equal basis which the bill requires. The under-
lying principle of the bill is the suppression of unjust discriminations, and it seems both fair
and just, and in harmony with that principle, to enable those victimized by its violation to
restore themselves, through the recovery of damages, to the equal position which they would
have occupied had the violation not been committed." SEN. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1936) 8. The Senate alone enacted this provision and ultimately withdrew it in con-
ference. H. R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 8.
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the value of its performance on a quasi-contractual basis. 31 Then, if further
injury appears, such as a lessening of Bruce's ability to compete,a2 a separate
suit for treble damages, 33 though repetitive, is necessary since the state courts
cannot assess treble damages.
The argument of the Florida court that, as a matter of sound judicial ad-
ministration, antitrust issues should not be raised in state courts, because
those tribunals are unable to handle the complex economic issues involved,34
is not persuasive. State courts have for many years policed state antitrust
legislation 35 and many have tried the defense of illegality under the Sher-
man 36 and Clayton " Acts. While state administration of federal antitrust
policy may not be the optimum, nevertheless the violator's choice of forum
should not foreclose an aggrieved vendee from his most practical form of
relief.
If precedent is needed to support the decision that illegality is a valid
defense in the instant case, the Supreme Court may find a "direct" relation-
ship between the price discrimination and the promissory notes. In any
event, it is to be hoped that the Court will use the opportunity afforded to
increase the effectiveness of the Robinson-Patman Act in the post-,,ar re-
sumption of antitrust enforcement.
31. 5 Wi LisTON, CoxrLCm s (Rev. ed. 1937) § 1631. For a graphic example of the
operation of this doctrine under a regulatory act see Rosasco Creameries, Inc. v. Cohen,
276 N. Y. 274, 11 N. E. (2d) 908 (1937). (1938) 37 Micn. L. Rrv. 136, Tcra" 249 App. Div.
228, 292 N. Y. Supp. 1 (ist Dept. 1936), (1937) 30 fimv. L. RIv. 1320.
32. The Act provides that discrimination is actionable if its effect "may be Eubstan-
tiallyto lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." 49 STAT. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13(a)
(1940). "Subsection (a) does not require that a discrimination actually result in any of the
various forms of competitive injury specified, but merely that discrimination have a nece-
sary or probable effect of the ind prohibited." Zown A ,D FELDm,%.IA, op. ciL supra note 27,
at 97.
33. Bruce has instituted such a suit. Brief for Appellee, p. 26.
34. The trial judge in the instant case voiced this objection several times. "This ques-
tion is not one that ought to be before this Court as I have had occaion to remarl: but it
ought to have been before the Federal Trade Commission on the question of whether or not
this sytem that is set up here is legal under the Robinson-Patman Act. It hasn't got any
business in this Court because we have not the facilities to investigate all those thing5 and
we are not the body authorized to investigate whether or not their system of doing businecs
is legal under the Robinson-Patman Act." Record on Appeal, pp. 578-9.
35. Virtually all states have antitrust statutes. They are collected and compared in
Legis. (1932) 32 CoL. L. Rn-v. 347.
36. Allen v. Parks, 196 Iowa 943, 195 N. W. 745 (1923), Schill v. Remington-Putnam
Book Co., 182 Md. 153, 31 A. (2d) 467 (1943), Remington Rand, Inc. v. International Buzi-
ness Mach. Corp., 167 Misc. 10S, 3 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 515 (Sup. Ct. 1937). Cf. Parher v.
Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 351-2 (1943). Violation of the Sherman Act has alko been pleaded
successfully as an equitable defense in a state court. See Note (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1114.
37. Ainsworth v. Cooper Underwear Co., 227 App. Div. S37, 237 N. Y. Supp. 301 (4th
Dep't 1929); Remington Rand, Inc. v. International Business ,Mach. Corp., 167 Misc. 103,
3 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 515 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
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LAW AND EQUITY IN NEW YORK-STILL UNMERGED*
LAw and equity were merged in New York State with the introduction of
the Field Code I almost a century ago, yet insistence upon distinguishing
between them still produces confusion, delay, and needless multiplicity of
suits.2 Lawyers and judges steeped in lore conceive that ancient conceptual
institutions have an existence independent of the profession's recognition
and immune from legislative will to destroy. The dichotomy between law
and equity is regarded, not as an outmoded tool, but as an immutable condi-
tion to which men must adapt themselves. The New York Court of Appeals,
in the much cited case of Jackson v. Strong,3 stated it thus: "The inherent
and fundamental difference between actions at law and suits in equity cannot
be ignored."
Later decisions of the Court of Appeals promised abandonment of this
'position, but the court has vacillated so consistently that the most recent
decision can no longer be considered a safe basis for prediction. 4 This in-
decisiveness, which may be partially accounted for as a disinclination on
the part of the highest court of a state to concern itself seriously with "mere
matters of procedure," has resulted in considerable confusion in the decisions
of the lower courts of New York.
Basic to the code system of pleading simplification is the principle that the
* International Photo Recording Machines, Inc. v. Microstat Corp., 269 App. Div. 485,
56 N. Y. S. (2d) 277 (1st Dep't 1945); Atlantic Metal Products, Inc. v. Minskoff, 295 N. Y.
566, 64 N. E. (2d) 277 (1945).
1. "The distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all
such actions and suits, heretofore existing, are abolished; and there shall be in this state,
hereafter, but one form of action, for the enforcement or protection of private rights and tho
redress or prevention of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action." N.Y.
LAWS (1848) c. 379, § 62. See FIRST REPORT OF COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEAD-
ING (N. Y. 1848) 145. The present New York statute reads: "There is only one form of civil
action. The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of these
actions and suits, have been abolished." N. Y. CIVIL PRACTICE ACT, § 8.
2. CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 44-50; WALSH, A TREATiSE ON EQuITY (1930) 111;
James, Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1022;
Rothschild, New York Civil Practice Simplified: 1 (1927) 27 CoL.. L. REv. 258.
3. 222 N. Y. 149, 118 N. E. 512 (1917). Clark, The Union of Law and Eguity (1925)
25 COL. L. REV. 1, discusses the case at length as an ancient horrible, citing many cases
holding contra. See Walsh, Merger of Law and Equity Under Codes and Other Statutes (1929)
6 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 157, 222 N. Y. at 154, 118 N. E. 513.
4. Discussing Wainwright & Page v. Burr & McAuley, 272 N. Y. 130, 5 N. E. (2d)
64 (1936), a decision which seemed to repudiate the doctrine of Jackson v. Strong, Judge
Charles E. Clark, a learned commentator in the field, said, "But for the fact that no pro-
cedural matter seems to remain settled in New York, we might consider that this problem
had been settled. . . ." CLARK, CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1940) 531.
This pessimistic attitude was vindicated the same year by the court's decision in Terner v.
Glickstein & Terner, Inc., 283 N. Y. 299, 28 N. E. (2d) 846 (1940), which reaffirmed the




facts, and not the demand for judgment, determine the remedy., Even in
New York 6 it is generally recognized that the complainant's demand for
judgment is not part of his cause of action, and ought not to limit the award
of remedies.7 To reinforce this principle Section 111 of the New York Civil
Practice Act provides for amendment of the pleadings to conform to the
proof at any stage of the proceedings, including appeal, "so that relief may
be finally granted which is appropriate to the facts." 8
Nevertheless residuary resistance to the unification of law and equity,
expressing itself through the "theory of the pleadings" rule, which purports
to require that every complaint be brought on a definite theory, and that on
this theory complainant must try his case, frequently achieves a contrary
result. In misapplication the rule often reintroduces the old forms of action
and negates the principle that the demand for judgment should not limit the
remedy.
The confusion thus caused becomes apparent through study of a sampling
of two groups of decisions handed down since 1921. In both groups, com-
plaints were brought "in equity" when they should have been brought "at
law." There being no grounds for equitable relief, courts were faced with a
choice: could the court grant legal relief; should the case be transferred to the
trial calendar for jury trial; or must the plaintiff bring an entirely new action
"at law?"
From the standpoint of speedy and effective administration of justice, the
5. See N. Y. Cimr. PRAcwcE AcT, § 479; FED. RuLES Civ. Pnoc. § 54 (c). See alco
CLAnE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 184. For a contrary view see McCaskill, Actions and Causes
of Action (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 614.
6. New York judges are notoriously hostile to the spirit of the code. See AlcArthur v.
Moffet, 143 Wis. 564, 567, 128 N. NV. 445, 446 (1910) for the much quoted paragraph in
which Chief Justice Wislow characterizes the treatment afforded the "infant Code" as
"cold, not to say inhuman."
7. For an exception to the rule, designed to protect defendants in default casss, who
may have failed to appear in reliance upon the complaint's demand for judgment, see N. Y.
Civir. PRACTicE AcT § 479. Compare FED. Rums Crv. Pnoc. § 54 (c). See Cu=nhr, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 179-86, for a discussion of an illogical e-xtension of the exception in Nevw
York, occasioned by unfortunate wording of the New York statute.
8. "That section, new in 1921, has made it the duty of any court at any time in this
State to disregard a mistaken prayer for relief and all formal defects in a pleading before or
after judgment, and to administer the proper relief if it has jurisdiction on any statement of
facts properly pleaded and proved." Small v. Kronstat, 175 lisc. 626, 629, 24 N. Y. S. (2d)
535, 538 (Sup. Ct. 1940). See Rothschild, From Law and Equity to--VWat? (1927) 4 N. Y.
U. L. Rav. 114, 116; Alden, The -rew Civil Practice Ad and Rules (1922) 4 BuuL. Assoc.
BR N. Y. 34-5.
9. Barnes v. Quigley, 59 N. Y. 265 (1874); Jaclkon v. Strong, supra note 3; and cases
cited in notes 12 and 15 infra. Compare Albertsworth, The Theory of t&, Pleadings in Cede
States (1921) 10 CALIF. L. REV. 202, 224: "The courts following such a doctrine are still
dominated by what Mr. Justice Holmes has so aptly termed 'The inability of the 17th cen-
tury common law to understand or accept a pleading that did not exclude every misin-
terpretation capable of occurring to an intelligence fired with a desire to pervert.'" See
James, supra note 2, at 1029.
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most desirable result would seem to be a final judgment by the court in
which the action was brought, although if there were issues of fact which
could go to a jury, and no waiver of jury trial, the case should be transferred
to the trial calendar.10 Dismissal of the complaint, besides occasioning delay,
might seriously harm plaintiff's cause in cases where an attachment had been
levied, or the applicable statute of limitations had run out after the original
complaint. And even where the complaint is dismissed with leave to amend,
delay inevitably results.11
Where the court was faced with this choice before trial, on defendant's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action in equity, four com-
plaints were dismissed,' 2 four were dismissed with leave to amend,13 and in
six cases the motion was denied, and the cases proceeded to final judgment
by the court, or, where a jury issue was presented, were transferred to the,
trial calendar.' 4
In the second group of decisions, it was brought out during trial that there
were no grounds for the equitable relief sought. Five courts, adhering to the,
"theory of the pleadings" doctrine, dismissed the complaint."G Of the nine
10. The New York Constitution, Art. 1, § 2, provides that the right of trial by jury
"in all cases in which it has been heretofore used shall remain inviolate forever" unless.
waived. See Smith v. Western Pac. Ry., 203 N. Y. 499, 96 N. E. 1106 (1911). Sectlons
425 and 426 of the Civil Practice Act enumerate the actions in which a jury trial must be'
had, and the methods of waiver, respectively. For a full treatment of the right to jury triaL
under the codes, see CLARK, op. cit. supra note 2, at 52-71.
11. In addition to the time required for preparing and filing an amended complaint,.
delays would probably be incurred on the jury calendar not normally encountered on the
non-jury calendar. See JUDIcIAL CoUNcIL oF N.Y., 11i ANNUAL REPORT (1945) pp. 26-31L
12. Terner v. Glickstein & Terner, Inc., 283 N. Y. 299, 28 N. E. (2d) 846 (1940); Stand-
ard Film Service Co. v. Alexander Film Corp., 214 App. Div. 701, 209 N. Y. Supp. 924,
(1st Dep't 1925); Page v. St. Lawrence Condensed Milk Corp., 213 App. Div. 336, 210 N. Y.
Supp. 261 (3d Dep't 1925); Chadbourne v. Ritz Carleton Restaurant & Hotel Co., 207"
App. Div. 754, 202 N. Y. Supp. 805 (1st Dep't 1924).
13. Moen v. Thompson, N.Y. L. J., April 2, 1946, p. 1287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.); Vernon v.
Kelton, 48 N. Y. S. (2d) 659 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Brown v. Werblin, 138 Misc. 29, 244 N. Y.
Supp. 209 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Fidelity Trust Co. v. International Ry., 118 Misc. 227, 19s,
N. Y. Supp. 726 (Sup. Ct. 1922); accord, Peck v. Philipson, 265 App. Div. 110, 37 N. Y. S,
(2d) 788 (1st Dep't 1942).
14. Boissevain v. Boissevain, 252 N. Y. 178, 169 N. E. 130 (1929); Foley v. Realty
Associates, Inc., 245 App. Div. 725, 280 N. Y. Supp. 73 (2nd Dep't 1935); Bloom v. Gelb,.
227 App. Div. 619, 235 N. Y. Supp. 730 (2nd Dep't 1929); Westergren v. Everett, 218 App.
Div. 172, 218 N. Y. Supp. 68 (1st Dep't 1926); Superior Brassierle Co. v. Zimetbaum, 211
App. Div. 525, 212 N. Y. Supp. 473 (1st Dep't 1925); Port v. Holzinger, 212 App. Div. 124,
208 N. Y. Supp. 287 (2d Dep't 1925); accord, Sasanow v. Williamsburg Sav. Bank, 256
App. Div. 928, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 782 (2d Dep't 1939).
15. Dickinson v. Springer, 246 N. Y. 203, 158 N. E. 74 (1927); D'Aversa v. Guido, 213
App. Div. 355, 210 N. Y. Supp. 621 (2d Dep't 1925), aff'd per curiain 244 N. Y. 590, 155
N. E. 909 (1927); International Photo Recording Machines, Inc., v. Microstat Corp. 269,
App. Div. 485, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 277 (1st Dep't 1945); Poth v. Washington Sq. M. E. Church,
207 App. Div. 219, 201 N. Y. Supp. 776 (1st Dep't 1923); Stumpf v. Wells,. 197 N. Y. Supp.
389 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
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courts which did not follow this rule, three awarded money damages,", four
transferred the action to the trial calendar for jury trial,'7 and two, having
-considered whether there might be grounds for legal relief, dismissed for
failure to establish an action either "at law" or "in equity." 15
This bewildering diversity of result may be further illustrated by an ex-
amination of two recent decisions which reach diametrically opposite results
on very similar facts; International Photo Recording M[achines v. Microstal
Corporation 11 and Atlantic Metal Products v. MinskoffP" Both actions were
brought to reform a contract, and for a money judgment on the contract
as reformed.
Litigation in the International case opened in New York City Court, where
plaintiff sued to recover unpaid installments on the contract. Defendant
alleged a loophole in the contract as written, whereupon plaintiff discon-
tinued his suit, and brought this action for reformation in Supreme Court.
The court found that there was no loophole, and thus no grounds for reforma-
tion. Having determined that the contract on its face meant what plaintiff
claimed it should mean, the court awarded him a money judgment.2 On
appeal, the First Department of the Appellate Division reversed and dis-
missed the complaint, basing its decision on the strict "theory of the plead-
ings" rule and citing Jackson v. Strong.
In the Atlantic case, the trial court reformed the contract and awarded a
money judgment. The Second Department, in a memorandum decision,
held that there were no grounds for reformation, but affirmed the money
judgment for breach of the contract as originally written, citing Section 111
of the Civil Practice Act. 22 Defendant, in his brief before the Court of Ap-
peals, relied heavily upon the decision in the International case, which had
been handed down while his appeal was pending. Plaintiff, while attempting
to distinguish the cases, based his argument on the fact that Section 111 had
not been brought to the First Department's attention in the International
case. 23 The Court of Appeals, per curiant, unanimously affirmed the judg-
ment for plaintiff as modified by the Second Department.
16. Atlantic Metal Products v. Minskoff, 267 App. Div. 1002, 48 N. Y. S. (2d) 436
(2d Dep't 1944); aff'd per curianx, 295 N. Y. 566, 64 N. E. (2d) 277 (1945); Dobchiner v.
Levy, 179 Misc. 416, 39 N. Y. S. (2d) 277 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Small v. Kronstat, 175 Misc. 626,
24 N. Y. S. (2d) 535 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
17. Syracuse v. Hogan, 234 N. Y. 457, 138 N. E. 406 (1923); Hermes v. Compton, 260
App. Div. 507, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 126 (2d Dep't 1940); Casey v. Nye Odorlecs Incinerator
Corp., 238 App. Div. 242, 264 N. Y. Supp. 207 (1st Dep't 1933); Fuegle v. Parlny Farm
Stables, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 14, 1941, p. 1034 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.).
1S. Claris v. Richards, 260 N. Y. 419, 183 N. E. 904 (1933); Ehrlich v. Jack 4Mills, Inc.,
215 App. Div. 116, 213 N. Y. Supp. 395 (1st Dep't 1926), aff'd new., 248 N. Y. 598, 162
N. E. 539 (1928); accord, Saperstein v. Mechanics & Farmers Say. Bank, 228 N. Y. 257,
126 N. E. 708 (1920).
19. 269 App. Div. 485, 56 N. Y. S. (2d) 277 (1st Dep't 1945).
20. 295 N. Y. 566, 64 N. E. (2d) 277 (1945).
21. 183 Misc. 394,4S N. Y. S. (2d) 196 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
22. 267 App. Div. 1002,48 N. Y. S. (2d) 436 (2d Dep't 1944).
23. Reply Briefs for Appellant and Respondent, Atlantic Metal Products, Inc., v.
Minskoff, 295 N. Y. 566, 64 N. E. (2d) 277 (1945).
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Since the lower court opinion in the Atlantic case was not reported, the
Second Department opinion was a one-page memorandum, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed without opinion, 24 the significance of the Atlantic case may
not be readily apparent to courts faced with a similar problem. It is impor-
tant, therefore, to note that the decision further discredits the "theory of the
pleadings" rule, and emphasizes the utility of Section 111 as a speedy and
economical means of granting the relief appiopriate to the facts stated in a
complaint. However the precedential effect of a per curiam decision may be
very insubstantial in a jurisdiction where lengthy opinions have not proved
binding.
It has been suggested that further legislation, looking toward the establish-
ment of "one means for commencement of an action, pleading, and dock-
eting," 25 might help to obviate the confusion which still exists in New
York as to the blending of law and equity sought by the Commissioners
in 1848.28 However, failure of bench and bar alike to make more effective use
of reinforcing provisions like Section ll,-only four of the twenty-eight
decisions tabulated supra make reference to the section p--indicates that
the whole answer to the problem is not additional legislation.
A better understanding of the purposes which the framers of the code
sought to effectuate, and a clearer working knowledge of the tools provided
in the present Civil Practice Act for the accomplishment of those purposes,
should hasten the demise of the "inherent" distinctions which, while de-
creasing in importance in other states 21 and in the federal courts," con-
tinue to plague litigants in the birth state of the code.
24. It seems unfortunate that the court did not see fit to write a full opinion, The clash
between the "theory of the pleadings" rule and Section 111 was brought out clearly in the
briefs, Respondent's brief suggesting that Section 111 was inserted specifically to avoid a
repetition of the results reached in Jackson v. Strong.
25. Comment (1942) 27 IowA L. REV. 451, 463. For suggested reforms in Illinois, see
Fisher, Wedding Law and Equity (1946) 40 ILL. L. REv. 326, 342.
26. FIRST REPORT OF COMfMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING (N. Y. 1848) 67-87,
137-47.
27. Atlantic Metal Products, Inc., v. Minskoff; Boissevain v. Boissevain, 252 N. Y. 178,
169 N. E. 130 (1929); Moen v. Thompson, N. Y. L. J., April 2, 1946, p. 1287 (N. Y. Sup.
Ct.); Small v. Kronstat, 175 Misc. 626, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 535 (Sup. Ct. 1940), For the use of
Section 111 to avoid duplication of action in the converse situation, where a complaint was
brought "at law" which should have been brought "in equity," see Bruff v. Rochester Trust
& Save Deposit Box Co., 118 Misc. 394, 193 N. Y. Supp. 321 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
28. "These decisions (referring to Jackson v. Strong and Maguire v. Tyler, 47 Mo. 115
[1870]) are not followed in the majority of code states or in England. Clearly, then, they
are not necessary consequences of a united procedure." James, supra note 2, at 1029, See
Walsh, op. cit. supra note 2, at 110; Clark, supra note 3, at 9.
29. "The distinction between law and equity has no procedural significance whatever
except where the right to a jury trial has been affirmatively denied, after a timely demand,
in an action which historically would be considered as arising at 'law.' " Groome v. Steward,
142 F. (2d) 756 (App. D. C. 1944).
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DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS OF A STATE CLASS ACTION"
BOTH the true class suit and the spurious class suit 1 were developed by
courts of equity because of the rigor of rules as to joinder of parties. Where
joinder of all parties was required by substantive law and numbers alone
made such a suit impractical, equity in the true class action permitted rep-
resentation of all interested parties by a few and entered a decree binding
on members of the group not personally served.2 Equity also allowed joinder
to avoid a multiplicity of action when there was an issue common to any
group of litigants; I but the judgment in this, the spurious suit, was not con-
clusive upon persons not served.
4
With the advent of state code procedure these two actions were brought
together in the same rule although they retained their separate definitions.3
This verbal distinction was removed by subsequent judicial interpretation
and the true and spurious class actions became one 0 in both state and federal
practice.7 However, since the scope of judgment in the two actions differed,
their judicial consolidation caused confusion in considering pleas of res
judicata5 Therefore, an attempt was made to distinguish linguistically
between the two actions by requiring a "common or general interest" among
the members in a true class suit, and a "common question of law or fact" in
the spurious actions But this distinction proved too fugitive to be satis-
factory.'0
The Federal Rules partially n clarified the use of the class suit in federal
" Richardson v. Kelly, 15 Tex. Sup. Ct. Rep. 118 (1945).
1. The use of the words "true" and "spurious" in this context is not in their correct
historical sequence. Street first used these words to denote two types of cla s actions; the
true class suit he considered to be concerned with a fund or property and the spurious ith
personal liability. 1 STREET, FEDERn.L EQUITY PRACTICE (1909) 342-5.
2. Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 283 (U. S. 1853); 2 MNoorn, Fn nnAL Pncr
(1933) 2235 (hereinafter cited as MOORE); CLARK, HANDBOOF OF TUE L,W OF CODE PLEAD-
DiG (1928) 277-82; Lesar, Class Suits and the Fcderal Rules (1937) 22 :in;. L. REv. 34.
3. 2 MooaE at 2241-5; Lesar, supra note 2, at 35.
4. Ayer v. Kemper, 48 F. (2d) 11 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
5. The typical code proision states, "Where the question is one of a common or
general interest of many persons or where the persons who might be made parties are very
numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may
sue or defend for the benefit of all." Note (1934) 19 CoRn-. L. Q. 614, 615-6 (italics supplied).
6. This occurred when the disjunctive, italicized in note 5 supra, was changed to the
conjunctive. 2 looRE at 2227; Note (1942) 30 CALIF. L. REv. 350.
7. "When the question is one of common or general interest to many parmons consti-
tuting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court,
one or more may sue or defend for the whole." For a summary of federal e.,perience, sce
Lesar, supra note 2, at 34-7.
8. McLaughlin, The Mystery of the Representlatie Suit (1938) 26 GEo. L. J. 873, 903.
9. Skinner v. Mitchell, 108 Kan. 861, 866, 197 Pac. 569, 571 (1921).
10. 2 looRE at 2230; Lesar, supra note 2, at 35; Wheaton, Represent lire SuitsInrgr-
ing Numerous Litigants (1934) 19 Come. L. Q. 399, 407.
11. Gavit, The New Federal Rules and State Procedure (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 367, 374.
But see Sunderland, The New Federal Rules (1938) 45 W. VA. L. Q. 5, 16.
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procedure and, by example, offered a solution for state practice. Although
the original draft of Rule 23(a) 12 attempted a more precise identification of
the scope of the judgment in each action, two sources of confusion were
retained in the Rule as finally adopted: '3 (1) the requirement of a "common
question of law or fact" in the spurious suit which suggested the syntax of
the "common or general interest" doctrine, and (2) the requirement of
representation in the spurious action where it should have been immaterial.
But the federal courts, adhering to the underlying theory of the Rule as
expressed in the original draft, have limited the true class suit to actions
where, traditionally, all parties had to be joined. 14 And the spurious action
has been employed merely as a jurisdictional device to allow members of the
spurious class to intervene in a diversity suit, although complete diversity
would not have existed had they been original parties."5
Injustice may result from the effect accorded class suit judgments in
those states which have copied Rule 23(a) in its entirety, unless the inter-
pretation of the federal courts (that joinder be required) is adopted in true
class suits and the inapplicability of spurious suits to state practice is recog-
nized. This is illustrated by Richardson v. Kelly 1' wherein the Supreme
12. The original draft in subparagraph (b) described the "Effect of Judgment" in each
type of class action, and in subparagraph (c) detailed the "Requisites of Jurisdiction." See
Moore, Federal Rides of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft
(1937) 25 GEo. L. J. 551, 571.
13. "Rule 23. Class Actions.
(a) REPRESENTATION. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly
insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the
character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right refuses
to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may
affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights
and a common relief is sought." These three categories of class actions have been named
true, hybrid and spurious respectively. 2 MooRE at 2230. It should be noted that Street's
definition, set forth in note 1 supra, of the true suit is essentially that of the hybrid suit in
this Rule, since the property test was considered to be too narrow for the true class action.
Lesar, supra note 2, at 45. The hybrid suit as contained in subparagraph (2) will not be
considered in the present discussion since it is not pertinent thereto.
14. Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F. (2d) 851 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945); Oppenheimer v. F. J.
Young Co., 144 F. (2d) 387 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); York v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 143 F.
(2d) 503 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944) rev'd on other grounds, 326 U. S. 99 (1945); Farmers Co-op. v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 133 F. (2d) 101 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942); Boesenberg v. Chicago Title
& Trust Co., 128 F. (2d) 245 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942).
15. See 2 MooRa at 2241-5; Sperry Products, Inc. v. Ass'n of American Railroads,
132 F. (2d) 408 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942); Hunter v. Southern Indemnity Underwriters, Inc.,
47 F. Supp. 242 (E. D. Ky. 1942).
16. 15 Tex. Sup. Ct. Rep. 118 (1945). Texas Rule 42 is identical with Federal Rule
23(a) with the single exception-probably not intended since it introduces an ambiguity-
that the Texas Rules have omitted the comma after the word "common" as it appears in
subparagraph (1) of the Federal Rules.
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Court of Texas sustained a plea of res judicata based upon a prior class
judgment and thereby deprived many defendants of their rights seemingly
without their day in court.
Pursuant to a Texas statute,17 3200 subscribers to National Indemnity
Underwriters, an inter-insurance exchange, had executed powers of attorney
to an agent authorizing him to exchange indemnity contracts and to act for
them in all matters related to the business. Although not required by statute,
these powers of attorney provided that the participants were to be bound
severally, not jointly, and limited the liability of each to one additional
yearly premium on any policy carried by him.5
In 1937 National was adjudged insolvent and a state receiver was ap-
pointed to liquidate the business. Subsequently, the receiver instituted a
suit 1 against 190 subscribers, seemingly to recover additional premiums
and obtained a dismissal without prejddice when the defendants prepared
to contest the action. A year later, pursuant to a court order in the receiver-
ship action, the receiver commenced a plenary action against 28 named
defendants "and all other subscribers and policyholders" to assess each of
the 3200 members one annual premium. The receiver chose as defendants
subscribers with a small premium liability and avoided any policyholders
who had been made parties to the first action.P Of the 28 named defendants
the receiver dismissed as to two, six defaulted and seventeen settled before
judgment.21 Judgment was obtained against the remaining three binding
all subscribers as "a class whose rights . . . are fairly and truly represented
herein by the named defendants appearing and answering." No appeal was
taken since the receiver settled with two of the three defendants contesting
the action and the liability of the third was too small to justify the expense
of an appeal.
17. A statute permitting individuals, partnerships and corporations designated as
subscribers, to exchange reciprocal or inter-insurance contracts with each other. TFx. RLI.
Clv. STAT. AxN. (Vernon, 1945) arts. 5024-33.
18. The Te,:as Court of Civil Appeals concerned itself largely with the problem of
whether this liability was contained in all the powers of attorney and decided that it vas.
Richardson v. Kelly, 179 S. NV. (2d) 991, 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944). The diszent in the T a
Supreme Court also accepted this interpretation. 15 Tex. Sup. Ct Rep. 118, 126.
19. There is some doubt concerning the form of that action. The majority opinion
referred to it as one against partners, 15 Tex. Sup. Ct. Rep. 118, 119 (1945), while the dis-
sent stated that the receiver "had named 190 of the subscribers as representative of the
class." 15 Tex. Sup. Ct. Rep 118, 127 (1945).
20. The receiver, however, contended that 25 of the 28 defendants had been included
in the original suit against 190 subscribers. See Respondents' Argument In Support Of Hi-
Motion For Rehearing, pp. 100-i. This disputed point and others of a similar nature can be
resolved by a reference to the opinions. The majority tacitly admitted their existence when
they disposed of the allegations "as to the manner in which the receiver selected defendants
and proceeded with the litigation" by stating that the trial judge must have weighed them
and that he still gave judgment against the class. 15 Tex. Sup. Ct. Rep. 118, 125 (1945).
21. Three other subscribers intervened in the suit but, in return for the receivera'
agreement not to issue execution against them, they did not resist the action. One of the
original 28 also settled in this manner. 15 Tex. Sup. Ct. Rep. 118, 128 (1945).
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A month after judgment became final, the present suit was instituted by
other subscribers in the nature of a bill of review to set aside the previous
judgment alleging that lack of notice of the prior proceedings and inade-
quate representation therein constituted a denial of due process of law. But
the lower court held that the prior judgment was res judicata and gave
judgment for the receiver in a cross-action for an assessment from the peti-
tioning subscribers. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed 22 the decision of
the lower court, holding that the prior action was a true class suit 23 and that
the common rights and interest of the class had been adequately represented.
Two judges dissented, stating that either the prior litigation was a spurious
class suit since the rights were not "joint" or "common" or, if it was a true
class suit, the representation was inadequate.
The conclusion that the prior action was a true class suit might better
have been reached by emphasizing the substantive necessity of joining all
parties defendant rather than by resort to the "common or general interest"
theory.2 4 Thus, in establishing the liability of the entire class, the receiver
had two alternatives: the impractical one of joining all 3200 policyholders ;25
or the more feasible one of suing a representative number of the subscribers.
Had the court adopted this approach, it would have been unnecessary to
consider the stipulations in the powers of attorney providing for several
liability and their bearing upon the question of a "common interest". 20
22. The court decided the case on a rehearing and withdrew the opinion handed down
after the original hearing. Chief Justice Alexander wrote the withdrawn opinion in which
he contended that the prior action was not a true class suit-in fact not even a spurious suit.
14 Tex. Sup. Ct. Rep. 383 (1945). In the intervening period the number of justices had
been increased and the Chief Justice then wrote the dissent.
23. Whereas the first opinion was reasoned on an interpretation of Texas Rule 42 and
Federal Rule 23(a), on rehearing neither opinion made a direct reference to these rules.
This is probably the result of the receiver's contention that judgment in the class suit here
involved was entered on March 8, 1941 while Rule 42 did not become effective until Sept. 1,
1941, thus making the Rule inapplicable. See Respondent's Argument In Support of His
Motion for Rehearing, pp. 2-3. But that the court applied Rule 42 is evident in the use by
both opinions of terminology found in that Rule. Perhaps, reference to the Rule was avoided
in order to obviate any discussion as to its applicability.
24. This was originally the Pomeroy test. POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (4th ed, 1904)
392. It is the test that has been applied under Rule 23(a). 2 MOORE at 2235; see also cases
cited note 14 supra. The common or general interest test is not without support based
mainly on the contention that the joinder rule is too narrow a test and that the courts should
be given more discretion. Wheaton, Representative Suits Involving Numerous Litigants
(1934) 19 Con . L. Q. 399, 410, 435; Blume, The "Common Questions" Principle in the Code
Provisionfor Representative Suits (1932) 30 MxcH. L. REV. 878, 903; Note (1922) 36 MARV.
L. REV. 89, 93. The difficulty with this approach is that it tends to "overlook factors, such
as that various defenses (estoppel, set-off, contributory negligence, etc.) may exist against
some complaints and not against others, which indicate that parties whose rights are sep-
arable should not be concluded from asserting those rights by a judgment rendered in an
action to which they were not parties.' Lesar, supra note 2, at 50.
25. TEXAS RuLEs Civ. PRoc. (1941) Rule 39(a): "Except as otherwise provided in
these rules, persons having a joint interest shall be made parties and be joined as plaintiffs
or defendants."
26. A class may conceivably have rights that are several as well as joint, but the true
[Vol.55
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However, since Texas had adopted the language of Rule 23(a) in toto,
the court felt it necessary to distinguish a spurious action from the case at
bar. But the court ignored the fact that in the federal courts the spurious
suit has become a mere procedural device, wholly inapplicable to state
practice.? As a result, the requirement of a common question of law or fact
in the spurious action inferentially forced the use of the common or general
interest theory in identifying the true class suit.!-3
Thus, in considering the identification of the type of class action as the
primary issue in the case, the court slighted the question of whether the
character of representation satisfied the requirements of due process.o The
representation seems inadequate both in quantity and quality. Although
quantitatively the original group of 28 defendants fairly represented the
class, 30 that number degenerated to a doubtful one before the judgment
class suit litigates only those which are joint. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble 255
U. S. 356 (1921). Personal defenses of each subscriber wll be litigated in individual actions
instituted by the receiver to collect the assessments. Essentially, the crozs-action by the
receiver to collect the assessment in the present case constituted such a suit. The fact that
only joint issues were litigated in the class action and that personal defenses still e.xist was
recognized in the majority opinion: "Since the class suit wams valid and since the orly de-
fenses pleaded by petitioners, as cross defendants, were their several attackrs on its validity,
it only remained for the receiver, in order to recover on his cross action against petitioner,
to show that they were subscribers during the involvency period and the amount of the
annual premiums paid by them during that period." 15 Tex. Sup. Ct. Rep. 118, 125 (1945)
(Italics supplied).
27. See note 15 supra. And, although some states have used the spurious suit as a
permissive joinder device, it is unnecessary in states, like Texas, with liberal joinder rules.
See Lesar, supra note 2, at 50. Texas Rule 40 is identical with Federal Rule 20 and allows
joinder of parties "if any question of law or fact common to all of them ,,ill arise in the
action."
28. And the real nature of both actions was clouded by the provision for representation
in the spurious suit, although judgment in such a proceeding binds only those made parties
defendant. The requirement of representation in the spurious suit is equally superfluous in
federal practice. "As the suit comes within Rule 23(a)(3), so that a judgment vill not be
res judicata as to noteholders who do not intervene, there is no necessity for a Eearching
inquiry concerning the adequacy of her representation of others in the class." Yorh v.
Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 143 F. (2d) 503, 528 n. 52 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944), rcvd on o!Iher
grounds, 326 U. S. 99 (1945).
29. The majority placed its main emphasis on Southern Ornamental Iron Worls v.
Morrow, 101 S. IV. (2d) 336 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), wherein the Court of Civil Appeals
overruled an objection to the adequacy of the representation of a class, and as in the instant
case no appeal was taken. The majority also gave considerable weight to an amcus curiacbrief
submitted by the Texas Attorney General to the effect that the 2Morrow case should not be
overruled because other receiverships of reciprocal insurance associations were collecting
assessments on the basis of that decision. 15 Ten. Sup. Ct. Rep. 118, 121 (1945). See Amicus
Curiae Brief and Argument On Behalf of the State of Texas, pp. 11-2. In view of the reli-
ance on the M1orrow case it is important to note that in the court's opinion in that case
"neither the Texas cases nor the ones cited from other jurisdictions seem to have considered
the question whether such class judgments are violative of the notice and jurisdiction re-
quirements of due process of law." Note (1937) 16 T-vAs L. REv. 113, 114.
30. The actual number of representatives has always been treated with liberality since
mere numbers is not the criterion. 2 MOORE at 2234.
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became final. Some of the named defendants had interests adverse to the
class,3' and all had small liabilities that may well have influenced the spirit
of the defense and the ease of settlement. Since the underlying premise of a
-true class action is that the parties actually joined will fairly represent the
interests of the class, judicial approval of so limited a sampling as that in the
_Richardson case seems unfair and suggests the need for stricter standards of
.representation. 32
RussELL P. DUNCANt
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ALIEN PROPERTY CONTROL*
UPON the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act 1 a broad system of foreign
-property control was built by amendment 2 during World War II. Two
principal tools were employed, "freezing" 3 and "vesting." 4 The latter is
-the transfer of title and possession of property in the United States of desig-
31. Apparently, some of the named defendants in the class suit had insurance claims
-against the receiver, thereby benefiting from the receiver's successful prosecution of the suit.
15 Tex. Sup. Ct. Rep. 118, 132 (1945).
32. Petitioner-subscribers are seeking a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of
-the United States. That Court has said that "Such a selection of representatives for purposes
-of litigation, whose substantial interests are not necessarily or even probably the same as
-those whom they are deemed to represent, does not afford that protection to absent parties
which due process requires." Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 45 (1940), (1941) 39 Micl. L.
REv. 829, 89 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 525. Although under the doctrine of the Htansberry case it
might be expected that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari, it may be suggested that
the writ will be denied since Richardson v. Kelly was heard at length on the merits in the
lower court and certainly with adequate representation.
t Third Year Class, Yale Law School of Law.
*Josephberg v. Markham, Alien Property Custodian, 152 F. (2d) 644 (C. C. A. 2d,
1945).
1. 40 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U. S. C. (App.) §§ 1-31 (1940), 55 STAT. 839, 50 U. S. C.
-(App.) § 5 (Supp. I, 1941), cited hereafter by section number only.
2. In 1933 Section 5(b) was amended to strengthen the President's foreign exchange
-controls. 48 STAT. 1 (1933), 12 U. S. C. § 95(a) (1940). In 1940 Section 5(b) was amended
to confirm the authority of the first presidential freezing orders, which had been based on the
:section as amended in 1933. 54 STAT. 179, 50 U. S. C. (App.) § 5 (1940); Comment, Foreign
Funds Control Through Presidential Freezing Orders (1941) 41 COL. L. REv. 1039, 1041. In
1941 the vesting power was added. See note 4 infra.
3. Inaugurated April 10, 1940, when Germany overran Denmark and Norway. Extc.
'ORDER 8389, 3 CFR, Cum. SupP. (1943) 645. Successive German conquests were met with
.extensions of the controls culminating on June 14, 1941, with their application to virtually
.all of Europe. ExEc. ORDER 8785, 3 CFR, Cumt. Supp. (1943) 948. See ADmINISTRATION OF
THE WARTIME FINANCIAL AND PROPERTY CONTROLS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
<U. S. Treasury Department 1942); Littauer, The Unfreezing of Foreign Funds (1945) 45
COL. L. REv. 132; Reeves, The Control of Foreign Funds by the United States Treasury (1945)
11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 17.
4. The vesting power was written into § 5(b) by Title III of the First War Powers
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nated foreign and enemy countries and their nationals 5 to the Alien Prop-
erty Custodian 6 to be ". .. held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or
otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the United
tat.... ,, Passed under the pressure of the need for executive action
to wage economic warfare, the amendment containing the vesting authority
restricted it only to "... any property or interest of any foreign country
or national thereof . . ." s Leaving the definitions and details to be filled
in by executive orders and administrative rulings has made the vesting
power a controversial issue.
Act, 1941. 55 STAT. 839, 50 U. S. C. (App.) § 616 (Supp. I 1941). The Office of Alien Prop.
erty Custodian was established and the vesting power delegated by ExEc. ORDE 9095,
3 CFR, Cum. Surp. (1943), 1121, March 11, 1942, as amended by Exc. ORDER 9193, 3
CFR, Cums. Sum'. (1943) 1174, July 6, 1942. The latter order allocated the foreign property
controls between the Secretary of the Treasury and the Alien Property Custodian. See
Hearings before Subcommittee No. I of the Comittee on the Judiciary on H. M 4840, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) 71-74; Lourie, Tie Trading with the Enemy Act (1943) 42 MIxcr. L.
Rmv. 205; Comment, The Powers and Duties of the Alien -Property Custedian (1943) 11 GEe.
WASH. L. Rxv. 357.
5. For the definition of "national" see note 9 infra. The Custodian is empowered to
vest six categories of property, three of which involve foreign countries and their nationals,
three of which involve enemy countries and their nationals. EXEC. ORDER 9193, 3 CFR,
Cum. SUpp. (1943), 1174, July 6, 1942; ANNu, L REPORT OFFICE OF ALiE PROPEnRZ
CUSTODIAN (1944) 3.
6. Property valued at about $8,500,000,000 was subjected to foreign property control
during the war. Hearings before Subcommittee No. I of the Committee on the Judiciary on
H. 1? 4840, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) 105. About $200,000,000 of this was vested. A.,-
NUAL REPORT OFFICE OF ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN (1944) 16.
7. Section 5(b). "It is the intention of the Custodian to reduce to cash as large a
proportion as possible of the property vested in him." ANNUAL RErO RT OFFICE or Axanm;
PROPERTY CUSTODIAN (1944) 19.
S. Section 5(b). A survey of the Congressional debates reveals little conception of the
true scope and meaning of the measure being passed. Frequent references were made to the
applicability of the vesting power to the property of "aliens" and "enemies" only, despite
the fact that the authority being granted clearly extended to the property of citizens and
non-enemies in some cases. See 87 CoNG. REc. 9838, 9856, 9859, 9865 (1941). The impres-
sion seems to have been that the purpose of the addition of the vesting power was to makze
possible unrestricted use by the United States of property as to which the power of "zeizure"
already existed. 87 CONG. REc. 9845,9856,9865(1941).
9. The term "national" was first used in ExEc. ORDER 8389, 3 CFR, Cmu. Supp. (1943)
645, April 10, 1940. The definition includes "Any person who has been domiciled in, or a
subject, citizen or resident of a foreign country at any time on or since the effective date
of this Order, . . . (iii) Any person to the extent that such person is, or has been, since such
effective date, acting or purporting to act directly or indirectly for the benefit or on behalf
of any national of such foreign country, and (iv) Any other person who there is a reasonable
cause to believe is a 'national' as herein defined." ExEC. ORDER 83S9, supra, as amended
by Exnc. ORDER 8785, 3 CFR, Cmur. Supp. (1943) 948, 950, June 14, 1941. The term first
appeared in the Act in the amendment of § 5(b) by the Joint Resolution of May 7, 1940,
54 STAT. 179, 50 U. S. C. (App.) § 5 (1940). The above definition was adopted for vesting
purposes by Exac. ORDER 9193, 3 CFR, Cuss. Supp. (1943) 1174, 1177, July 6, 1942. Cer-
tain additional findings must be made by the Custodian in determining that a perzon not
within a designated enemy country is a national of that country.
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In its haste Congress created two major judicial problems in the con-
struction of the statute. First, the incomplete meshing of the new provisions
with the old ones, some of which are inapplicable and others doubtfully
applicable to World War II,10 has forced the courts to do the job of the
draftsman in interpreting the Act. The courts have undertaken this task to
a limited extent. For example, in Markham v. Cabell 11 the Supreme Court
held that Section 9(e), barring debt claims acquired after October 6, 1917,
could have no application to a current creditor's suit under Section 9(a). 12
Second, Congress failed to provide specifically for any judicial review of the
exercise of the vesting authority 13 and has failed to remedy this defect
despite ample opportunity to do so. To avoid the consequent spectre of
unconstitutionality, one district court has remedied the apparent lack of
judicial review of vestings by holding 14 that Section 9(a), which authorized
a suit to recover property "seized" under Section 7(c) during World War 1,16
10. H. R. Ri'. No. 1507, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 2. A forceful argument has been
made that § 5(b), as amended in 1941, was intended to stand alone as an autonomous,
unitary system of foreign property control. See Lourie, supra note 4 at 218-219; McNulty,
Constitutionality of Alien Property Controls (1945) 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoD. 135, 146. But
see Dulles, The Vesting Powers of the Alien Property Custodian (1943) 28 CORxf. L. Q. 245.
For a review of the permanent and temporary provisions of the Act see Mr. Justice Burton's
concurring opinion in Markham v. Cabell, 66 Sup. Ct. 193,198 (U. S. 1945).
11. 66 Sup. Ct. 193 (U.S. 1945).
12. The inconsistencies of the Act were pointed out by the Custodian when he urged
that the suit should be barred because no creditors may recover against frozen property,
unless licensed by the Secretary of the Treasury, and because § 9(a) is in terms of creditors
of enemies or allied of enemies only, thus barring creditors of foreign nationals; he also
pointed out the administrative inconvenience resulting from allowance of such suits, The
court's answer was ". . . however meritorious these considerations are, they raise questions
of policy for Congress." Id. at 196. The court expressly limited its debision to recognition
of the right to sue on a debt; the questions of whether the amended § 5(b) nullifies the
§ 9(a) procedures for satisfaction of a judgment creditor's debt and for suit to reclaim
property which has been taken were not decided. Id. at 197.
13. The 1941 amendment of § 5(b), adding the vesting power, included no provision for
judicial review of vestings. 55 STAT. 839, 50 U. S. C. (App.) §§ 616-618 (Supp. 1, 1941).
Much controversy over the constitutionality of the vesting authority has focused on the
question of judicial review. See DomxE, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY IN WORLD WAt II
(1943) c. 17; AxNuAL REPORT OFFicE OF ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN (1944) 144-7;
Carlston, Foreign Funds Control and the Alien Property Custodian (1945) 31 CoRN. L. Q. 1,
21; Dulles, supra note 10 at 255; MeNulty, supra note 10 at 142; Wechsler, Constitutionality
of Alien Property Controls: A Comment on the Problem of Remedies (1945) 11 LAw & CoN-
TEMP. PROD. 149.
14. Draeger Shipping Co. v. Crowley, 49 F. Supp. 215 (S. D. N.Y. 1943).
15. It was held that the existence of the provision for judicial review of the taking
satisfied the constitutional requirements of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239 (1921); Central Union Trust Co. of New York v. Garvan,
254 U. S. 554 (1921). It was also recognized that the seizure conferred the immediate right
to possession on the Custodian unfettered by judicial interference but in the subsequent
§ 9(a) suit for the return of the property the validity of the seizure would be fully tested do
novo. Stoehr v. Wallace, supra; Central Union Trust Co. of New York v. Garvan, supra;
American Exchange National Bank v. Garvan, 273 F. 43 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
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applied to Section 5(b) "vestings" 11 despite the verbal incompatability of
the two sections.17 However, the problem of how much was reviewable in
such a suit remained.'3
In the recent case, Josephberg v. 2farkham,3 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals extended its review beyond the question of whether the property
owner was included within the literal terms of the statute and definitive
executive orders to reexamine the initial propriety of the vesting action. In
1943 the Alien Property Custodian, "deeming it necessary in the national
interest," vested 20 the property of Alfred Cerutti, a naturalized United
States citizen living in Italy, whom he found to be a "national of a desig-
nated enemy country." 21 Prior to the taking, the property had been in the
hands of a committee appointed by the Supreme Court of New York "
16. Various suggestions have been made for avoiding this result. See Carlston, sspra
note 13 at 21-2 (administrative claims procedure within the Office of Alien Property Custo-
dian sufficient); Dulles, supra note 10 at 255 (common law right to bring an in rcr proeed-
ing in the nature of replevin, to recover property which has wrongfully been taken into the
custody of an officer of the United States); McNulty, supra note 10 at 142 (allow "alien
friends" to sue for compensation under the Tucker Act).
17. Section 9(a) provides for suits by "any person not an enemy or ally of enemy" to
recover property which has been " . . conveyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid
to the Alien Property Custodian or seized by him. . . ." This plainly refers to § 7(c) which
provides that the property of enemies or allies of enemies " . . shall be conveyed, trana-
ferred, assigned, delivered or paid over to the Alien Property Custodian, or the came may be
seized by the Alien Property Custodian...." The § 5(b) language is " . . and any prop-
erty or interest of any foreign country or national thereof shall vest, when, as, and upon the
terms, directed by the President ... ." A literpl reading and application of § 9(a) would
have allowed the recovery of any property vested from foreign nationals not enemies or
allies of enemies, thus nullifying much of the vesting program. The courts have, however,
read § 9(a) as modified by § 5(b). Draeger Shipping Co. v. Crowley, 55 F. Supp. 906 (S. D.
N. Y. 1944).
18. Other cases of suits under § 9(a) for the return of vested property have not fully
clarified this. In the Draeger case the plaintiff had been found by the Custodian to be a
national of Germany by reason of acting for the benefit or on behalf of German nationabl.
Thus the determination of the plaintiff's status required judicial emaminatioa of the evidence
that he had been so acting, but not of the necessity of the vesting. Draeger Shipping Co.,
Inc. v. Crowley, 55 F. Supp. 906 (S. D. N. Y. 1944). In Standard Oil Company (New Jerey)
v. Markham, 67 U. S. P. Q. 263 (S. D. N. Y. 1945) the property had been vested a3 ovned
by a German corporation and the judicial inquiry was into the true ownership, not the
necessity for the vesting.
19. 152 F. (2d) 644 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
20. Vesting Order No. 1911, 8 Fed. Reg. 11187, Aug. 3,1943.
21. "2. The Alien Property Custodian is authorized and empowered to take such action
as he deems necessary in the national interest, including ... the power to ...vet...
(f) any property of any nature whatsoever which is in the process of administration by any
person acting under judicial supervision ...and which is payable or deliverable to, or
claimed by, a designated enemy country or national thereof." Exzc. OnDna 9193, 3 CFR,
Cui.. Surp. (1943) 1174,1175, July 6, 1942.
22. "The Custodian vests all enemy rights in property which is being administered by
persons acting under judicial supervision...." AxNUAL REroRT Orricn or AL-nz Pnop-
ERTY CUSTODUa.'N (1944) 10.
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which had adjudged Cerutti an incompetent in 1939. After complying with
the Custodian's order the committee sued under Section 9(a) to recover the
property in the District Court for the Southern District of New York,
challenging the finding that Cerutti was a national of Italy. The district
court dismissed the complaint,2 3 holding that Cerutti had established
"actual residence" in Italy in the sense that he intended to reside there
temporarily and was therefore an enemy 24 and a national 25 of Italy. The
appellate court reversed,26 rejecting the district court's definition of "resi-
dence," and held that because the property was in the hands of a judicially
supervised committee and because the type of property (cash and securities)
would not lend itself to war production purposes there was no need to hold
Cerutti to be a "resident" of Italy. This policy determination was doc-
trinally supported by saying that Cerutti, due to his mental incapacity,
lacked the requisite intent to establish even temporary "residence." Cerutti
was thus found to be not subject to vesting control 2 and his representatives
were allowed to sue and recover the property. 23
The facts of the existing judicial supervision of the property and the
innocuous character of the property, which refute any finding that it was in
danger of falling into enemy hands or that it need be put under government
control for war purposes,2 logically are relevant to determining whether the
23. Josephberg v. Markham, Alien Property Custodian, U. S. Dist. Co., S. D. N. Y.,
Civil 31-395, July 18, 1945.
24. "Any individual . .. of any nationality, resident within the territory . . . of any
nation with which the United States is at war." § 2(a).
25. See note 9 supra.
26. Josephbergv. Markham, 152 F. (2d) 644 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
27. Because he was not a "resident of" Italy within the meaning of the definition of a
"national." See note 9 supra. "We are bound to construe the term 'resident' in so far as
reasonably possible in a way to avoid . . . raising a serious doubt as to . ..constitu-
tionality. . . . If the term 'resident' is held to include a . . . citizen in the situation of
Cerutti .. . the failure to provide any remedy .. .other than what § 9(a) affords would
create such a doubt." Id. at 649. The court's doubts as to the constitutionality of this vest-
ing arise from its belief that something more than sequestration is involved. Ibd. As to
whether vesting amounts to confiscation see Carlston, supra note 13 at 5; Dulles, supra
note 10 at 250; Sommerich, Recent Innovations in Legal and Regulatory Concepts as to the
Alien and His Property (1943) 37 Am. J. INT. L. 58; Turlington, Vesting Orders under the
First War Powers Act (1942) 36 AM. J. INT. L. 460. The Supreme Court has stated that
power exists to confiscate enemy private property. See Miller v. United States, 11 Wall.
268, 305 (U. S. 1870); United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 11 (1926).
For the opposition to the exercise of this power see GATIuNGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
AMERICAN TREATMENT OF ALIEN ENEMY PROPERTY (1940); Borchard, Nationalization of
Enemy Patents (1943) 37 Am. J. INT. L. 92; Sommerich, A Brief Against Confiscation (1945)
11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 152.
28. Because Cerutti was not "resident within" Italy within the meaning of the defini-
tion of an "enemy." See note 24 supra. If Cerutti had been an "enemy," suit under § 9(a)
would have been barred. See note 17 supra.
29. For the statement of these basic purposes of trading with the enemy legislation see
iller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268, 305 (U. S. 1870); United States v. Chemical Founda-
n, Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 9 (1926). With respect to these purposes an interpretation of the
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Custodian's action was "necessary in the national interest." Had Congres
dearly established the requirement of a finding that each vesting be "neces-
sary in the national interest" 31 and empowered the courts to review that
finding, a strained construction of the term "residence" would not have been
necessary in this case. But as Congress had not provided a standard, the
Second Circuit was compelled to turn the case on "national," the only word
of delimitation in the statute, to effectuate a review of the compliance of the
Custodian's action with the purposes of alien property control."'
Although the courts have remedied some of the defects in the Act by
forced interpretation, the judiciary seems unsuited for such a procedure
Continued congressional inattention toward the definition of the relation
between the courts and the Custodian can no longer be justified on the
ground of war-time emergency. Yet, the most recent amendment of the
Act,32 providing for the return of vested property to a limited group of
war powers, U. S. Const. Art. I, § 8, not discussed in the Josephberg case, is important. If
the Trading with the Enemy Act is classed as an exercise of the power to "... make rules
concerning captures on land . . ." no court review of the necessity for such "captures"
would be possible. If interpreted as an exercise of the power to ".... make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution . . " the power "... to declare
war . . ." an inquiry into necessity becomes possible. See Littauer, Confiscation of the
Properly of Technical .Enemies (1943) 52 YALE L. J. 739. In Slodir v. Wallace the court
classed "seizures" under § 7(c) as "captures on land." 255 U. S. 239, 242 (1940). But cee
Littauer, supra, at 754 (Trading with the Enemy Act construed as an exercike of the general
war powers, not the power to regulate captures).
30. Section 5(b) contains no requirement that the vesting be "neceszary in the national
interest." It is in the delegation of authority by the President to the Custodian that the
phrase appears. See note 21 supra.
31. In view of the origin of the definition of the term "national" in the initial freezing
orders when Germany was overrunning Europe there seems little doubt that the word
"resident" in the definition was intended to mean mere physical presence in a designated
country. This was necessary to forestall Axis control of property by control of the p2r-,on
of the owner. See Lourie, "Enezmy" umer the Trading with e Enemy Act and Some Pratcrns
of International Law (1943) 42 Micu. L. Rnv. 383, 89. With respect to freezing the court in
the instant case recognizes this by stating that the property of Cerutti was subject to freez-
ing control. Josephberg v. Markham, 152 F. (2d) 644, 643 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945). The result
is a definition of "national" in the field of freezing controls inconsistent with its definition
in the field of vesting. The court relied on three World War I precedents in determining
that mere physical presence is not equivalent to residence for purposes of the definitions of
"national" and "enemy." Id. at 649. Of these, Miller v. Sinjen, 289 Fed. 388 (C. C. A. 8th,
1923), was a suit for the return of property the seizure of which was admittedly valid. The
issue was the plaintiff's citizenship, not his residence. In Vowinckel v. First Federal Trust
Co., 10 F. (2d) 19 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926), the court interpreted "residence" as equivalent to
domicile "for trade or otherwise." Stadtmuller v. Miller, 11 F. (2d) 732 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926),
the leading case, did hold that mere physical presence within is not equivalent to "reidence
within." But in each of these cases control of the property involved was open to Germany
through control of the person of the owner-the exact situation the new concept of "foreign
national" was designed to meet.
32. Pub. L. No. 322, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 8, 1946); C. C. H. War Law Service
1'6232 (1946).
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"non-hostiles," 33 while clarifying some difficulties, still fails to deal with
the problem of judicial review.34 Earlier drafts of the legislation included a
provision granting to claimants the right to sue for the return of vested
property, or for compensation, 35 but this safeguard was omitted in the final
bill, apparently the result of pressure for some immediate returns.3 0 How-
ever, piece-meal amendment does not seem to be optimum in view of the
present confusion regarding the statute, and this fact suggests a complete
reappraisal of the Act by Congress, an elimination of obsolete sections, and
an integration of the remainder, with the insertion of necessary provisions to
effectuate adequate judicial supervision of such broad administrative powers
of private property control.
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL IN PATENT LITIGATION'
ALTHOUGH restricted in theory to original contributions to science and
the useful arts,1 patents have, in practice, often been granted by an under-
33. Persons to whom the return of property is planned include ". . . friendly citizens
of the various countries that were overrun by the enemy, friendly neutrals, American citizens
who were caught, by the outbreak of war, behind enemy lines . . . citizens of enemy na-
tions who left their countries prior to 1941 and who, it is now clear, are and have been loyal
to the United States." SEN. REP. No. 920, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) 1-2.
34. The new legislation makes returns discretionary with the president or his desig-
nated agent except for specified categories of claimants to whom no returns may be made.
These barred groups include: enemy governments; corporations organized under the laws of
enemy nations; individuals voluntarily resident at any time since December 7, 1941, in
enemy territory, other than United States citizens and diplomatic and consular officers of
non-enemy nations; citizens and subjects of enemy nations present in enemy or enemy-
occupied territory or engaged in business in such territory at any time since December 7,
1941; certain foreign corporations or associations. In addition, property which was held
under a "cloaking" arrangement when vested is not to be returned, and a positive finding
must be made that the return is "in the interest of the United States." Pub. L. No. 322,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 8,1946); C. C. H. War Law Service 6232 (1946). See StN. REP.
No. 920, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. (1946) 1-2.
35. H. R. 4840 and H. R. 5031, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944). Persons who were not
"foreign nationals" were to be allowed to sue for the return of their property, or the proceeds
if the property had been liquidated; "foreign nationals" were to be allowed to sue for com-
pensation in the court of claims under 24 STAT. 505 (1887), as amended, 28 U. S. C. §§ 41(20)
and 250 (1940). Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on the Judiciary on
T. R. 4870, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) 19, 22.
36. H. R. 4571, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), the bill which finally passed, was the re-
sult of strong pressure from the governments of the liberated countries of Europe for the
release of the property of their nationals. See SEN. REP. No. 920, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1946) 2; H. R. REP. No. 1269, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) 8 (joint letter from the acting
Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Alien Property Custodian).
* Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 66 Sup. Ct. 101 (U. S. 1945).
1. U.S. CoNST. Art. I, § 8; 16 STAT. 201 (1870), as amended, 35 U. S. C. § 31 (1940):
1 WALKER, PATENTS (Deller's ed. 1937) §§ 8, 9.
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staffed and inefficient Patent Office for devices lacking in novelty.2 And
these oversights have frequently been perpetuated by courts in patent liti-
gation by adherence to the principle of estoppel. 3 Under this concept, the
assignor of a patent when sued by his assignee for infringement is estopped
to deny the novelty or validity of the patent in issue.4 The theory was
fashioned in the lower federal courts 5 and received the qualified approval of
the Supreme Court in Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company v.
Formica Insulation Company.6 There, the assignor of a patent, in a suit for
infringement by his assignee, was permitted to introduce evidence of the
prior art to narrow the scope of the patent, while conceding its validity.7
But, by way of dictum, the Court warned that such evidence was inadmis-
sible to destroy the patent because of the doctrine of estoppel.8
Under this rule, however, it was difficult to identify the point at which
"narrowing" of scope shaded into invalidation of the patent itself. And in
cases of complete anticipation of the assigned patent, lower federal courts
reached conflicting results as to whether the assignor wnas trying to limit 10
or destroy n the patent.
2. For a discussion of the "confusion which exists as to the very definition of inven-
tion" and the resultant issuance of invalid patents, see Posnack, IRrentior, Tr Law arc
Society (1945) 27 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 361, 369-75.
3. See Note (1943) 11 GEo. WASH. L. RnEv. 521, 529.
4. 2 W..ALR, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 349.
5. Babcock v. Clarkson, 63 Fed. 607 (C. C. A. 1st, 1894); Woodward v. Boston Lasting
Mach. Co., 60 Fed. 283, 284 (C. C. A. 1st, 1894) and cases cited therein; Faulks v. Kamp,
3 Fed. 898 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1880); Curran v. Burdsall, 20 Fed. 835 (N. D. Ill. 1883).
6. 266 U. S. 342 (1924), (1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 692, 13 CM.w. L. Rnv. 504.
7. 266 U. S. 342, 350 (1924). This had been the view of the lower federal courts with
the exception of the Seventh Circuit. See Martin & Hill Cash-Carrier Co. v. Martin, 67 Fed.
786, 787 (C. C. A. 1st, 1895); Standard Plunger Elevator Co. v. Stokes, 212 Fed. 941, 943
(C. C. A. 2d, 1914); Piano Motors Corp. v. Motor Player Corp., 282 Fed. 435,437 (C. C. A.
3rd, 1922); Leader Plow Co. v. Bridgewater Plow Co., 237 Fed. 376, 377 (C. C. A. 4th,
1916); Schiebel Toy & Novelty Co. v. Clark, 217 Fed. 760, 763 (C. C. L 6th, 1914); Moon-
Hopkins Billing Mach. Co. v. Dalton Adding Mach. Co., 236 Fed. 936, 937 (C. C. A. Sth,
1916); Leather Grille & Drapery Co. v. Christopherson, 182 Fed. 817 (C. C. A. 9th, 1910).
Contra: Foltz Smokeless Furnace Co. v. Eureka Smokeless Furnace Co., 256 Fed. 847
(C. C. A. 7th, 1919); Siemens-Halske Electric Co. v. Duncan Electric Mfg. Co., 142 Fed.
157 (C. C. A. 7th, 1905).
S. "The distinction may be a nice one but seems to be workable." 266 U. S. 342, 351
(1924).
9. "If no limitation at all, by reference to the specification, be imposed upon this claim
we reach the point where the distinction which the Court spoke of in the Formica case--
that is, using the prior art to construe and narrow a claim without letting it affect its validity
-remains nice but becomes unworkable. The situation is that of a claim, completely an-
ticipated by the prior art." Timken-Detroit Axle Co. v. Alma Motor Co., 47 F. Supp. 5S2,
588 (D. Del. 1942).
10. Some courts held that the assignor could show complete anticipation although this
narrowed the claims to nought. Casco Products Corp. v. Sinko Tool & Mfg. Co., 116 F.
(2d) 119 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); Timken-Detroit Axle Co. v. Alma Motor Co., 47 F. Supp.
582 (D. Del. 1942).
11. Some cases held that the assignor could not evade the doctrine by this indirect
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In the recent case of Scott Paper Company v. Marcalus Manufacturing
Company,"2 the Supreme Court rejected the estoppel principle as a bar to a
defense of anticipation by an expired patent but without a complete repudi-
ation of the use of the doctrine. In 1932 the Automatic Paper Company,
Scott's assignor, purchased from Marcalus, one of their employees, his patent
application for a "method and machine for mounting a cutting strip of hard
non-metallic substance on the edge of a box blank." Later, Marcalus left
Automatic and organized his own company using what the plaintiffs claimed
was the same device. In the ensuing suit for infringement, 'Marcalus offered
to prove that his machine was a copy of one patented in 1912 and, hence, was
part of the prior art. But the District Court excluded the evidence and
entered judgment for Automatic on the theory that Marcalus could limit
the scope of the patent but could not challenge its validity.13 The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that infringement was impossible
since there had been a complete anticipation of the patent.14
This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court.'" A majority of the
Court held that, since all expired patents reverted to the public domain, 10
the assignor as a'member of the public was free to use the device ;"7 and that
the estoppel principle of the Formica decision was not controlling.'8
This decision of the majority, with its emphasis upon the public interest,1"
is in harmony with two recent decisions limiting estoppel in other situations.
In Sola Electric Company v. Jefferson Electric Company," the Supreme Court
method. Buckingham Products Co. v. McAleer Mfg. Co., 108 F. (2d) 192 (C. C. A. 6th,
1939); West v. Premier Register Table Co., 27 F. (2d) 653 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928); Frank Asso-
ciates, Inc. v. Columbia Narrow Fabric Co., 33 F. Supp. 279 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
12. 66 Sup. Ct. 101 (U. S. 1945), rehearing denied 66 Sup. Ct. 263 (U. S. 1945), 59
HARv. L. R-v. 299, 27 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 860.
13. Automatic Paper Mach. Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 54 F. Supp. 105 (D. N. J. 1944).
For similar holdings see cases cited note 10 supra, and Libbey Glass Mfg. Co. v. Albert Pick
Co., 63 F. (2d) 469 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933); Swan Carburetor Co. v. General Motors Corp.,
42 F. (2d) 452 (N. D. Ohio 1927), aff'd 44 F. (2d) 24 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930); Cross Paper
Feeder Co. v. United Printing Mach. Co., 220 Fed. 313 (D. Mass. 1915), modified, 227 Fed.
600 (C. C. A. 1st, 1915); Automatic Switch Co. v. Monitor Mfg. Co., 180 Fed. 983 (C. C, D.
Md. 1910); Hurwood Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 138 Fed. 835 (C. C. D. Conn. 1905); Alvin Mfg. Co.
v. Scharling, 100 Fed. 87 (C. C. D. N. J. 1900).
14. Automatic Paper Mach. Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 147 F. (2d) 608 (C. C. A. 3rd,
1945). For similar decisions, see cases cited note 11 supra, and Dixie-Vortex Co. v. Paper
Container Mfg. Co., 130 F. (2d) 569 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942).
15. 66 Sup. Ct. 101 (U. S. 1945).
16. The grant of a patent to the inventor is conditional on its dedication to the public
at its expiration: Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 502, 510-1 (1917).
17. See Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, Comm'r of Patents, 324 U. S. 370, 378 (1945).
18. "To whatever extent that doctrine may be deemed to have survived the Formica
decision or to be restricted by it .... " 66 Sup. Ct. 101, 103 (U. S. 1945).
19. For illustrations of the impact of public interest upon estoppel principles, see
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Martin, 283 U. S. 209, 220-2 (1931); Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L.
Ry. v. Fink, 250 U. S. 577, 582-3 (1919).
20. 317 U. S. 173 (1942), (1943) 56 HARV. L. Rv. 814.
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denied that the doctrine of estoppel prevented a licensee under a patent from
attacking its validity when the license contained a price fixing covenant
violative of the spirit of antitrust legislation, and permitted the licensee to
demonstrate the invalidity of the patent.2' And in Nachman Spring-Filled
Corporation v. Kay Manufacturing Company,22 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, with an equal emphasis on the public interest,2 permitted the de-
fendant in an infringement suit to attack the novejty of a competitor's
patent although he had expressly contracted not to do so. -4 Thus, the trend
of decisions indicates that the doctrine of estoppel is being whittled away
by a process of exceptions rather than by direct renunciation.
The assumption of the dissenters in the Scott Paper case 2 1 that the theory
of estoppel has validity in the patent field seems doctrinally unwarranted.
The doctrine rests upon an analogy to property law, wherein estoppel is
invoked to prevent denial of his implied warranty as to title by the grantor
of land.2 1 But in patent cases the analogy has been expanded to prevent a
denial of title and a denial of the validity of the patent as well.' Moreover,
the property theory was developed in cases concerning private ownership
of land, and was inapplicable when the property in question was part of the
public domain. For example, if an individual grants to another land which
subsequently is proven to be government property the doctrine of estoppel
would not bar evidence of public ownership introduced by the grantor in a
suit to quiet title.2s Similarly, the assignor of an expired patent should not
21. See U. S. v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U. S. 241, 250 (1942); U. S. v.Masonite Corp.,
316 U. S. 265, 275-7 (1942).
22. 139 F. (2d) 781 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943), (1944) 43 Mxca. L. REv. 225.
23. This policy of concern for public interest has been axiomatic in recent Supreme
Court decisions. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111, 117-20 (1933);
Norman -v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 294 U. S. 240, 304-S, 309-10 (1935). For discuzions of
the trend towards restricting patent monopolies because of the public interest see Pomnack,
loc. cit. supra note 2; Feuer, Patent Abuse Versus National Interest (1942) 2 LAV,'Is Guua
REv. 1; Notes (1938) 26 GEo. L. J. 1049, 36 Mi. L. REv. 1214.
24. Although the defendant did not argue below that the patent vvas invalid, the
Circuit Court of Appeals considered the question because of the public policy underlying
the patent laws and the Sherman Act. See further American Cutting Alloys, Inc. v. General
Elect. Co., 135 F. (2d) 502 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
25. Mr. Justice Reed dissented on the ground that the District Court was correct in its
application of the Formica rule. Mr. Justice Frankfurter also dissented, asserting that the
public interest was unaffected, and that estoppel and the correlative principle of "fair deal.
dealing," forbade Marcalus' unjust enrichment at the expense of Automatic. 66 Sup. Ct.
101, 105-8 (U. S. 1945).
26. See TiFrANv, REAL PROPERTY (1940) § 768; Note (1903) 22 HA.v. L. REv. 136.
27. "The rule . . ., is that an assignor of a patent right is estopped to attack the utility,
novelty or validity of a patented invention which he has assigned . . ." Westinghouse
Elect. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U. S. 342, 349 (1924). The principle is mid to
cover validity, although there is no warranty of validity implied in any asaignment of a
patent right according to established patent law. See 2 WuAnER, op. cit. supra note 1 at
§ 348 and cases therein cited.
28. See Automatic Paper Mach. Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 147 F. (2d) 603,613 (C. C. A.
3rd, 1945).
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be estopped from proving this fact since such a patent belongs to the public
as a part of the prior art.
Functionally, the doctrine of estoppel as delimited by the Formica deci-
sion creates an anomaly in infringement suits. If the patent is only partially
anticipated, the infringing assignor may introduce evidence of prior art to
limit the claims of the patent; 2 but, if the patent is completely worthless,
the assignor is forbidden to produce any such evidence.3" Furthermore,
under the Formica rule the assignee's claims can be so limited as to leave him
with a mere technical right to a patent with little or no financial value. Thus,
only if the pre-Formica rule of absolute estoppel were recreated would the
assignee's monetary investment actually be protected.3"
The fact that the estoppel doctrine only enters litigation involving wholly
or partially invalid patents or expired-patents suggests the inadequacy of
our present system of patent administration. Judicially, patent dead-wood
may be eliminated by urging the federal courts to raise the issue of validity
on their own motions,3 2 by permitting the Patent Commissioner to intervene
in patent suits at his discretion,33 and by statutorily authorizing the Com-
missioner to institute declaratory actions to test patents of doubtful valid-
ity.34
Yet such recommendations do not strike at the source of the trouble. A
searching revision of the entire patent system is needed: including such
29. Westinghouse Elect. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U. S. 342 (1924). See 2
WALKER, op. cit. supra note 1 at § 349.
30. See Frank Associates, Inc. v. Columbia Narrow Fabric Co., 33 F. Supp. 279, 282-3
(S. D. N. Y. 1940).
31. Even then such a rule prevailed only in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See
note 7 supra.
32. See Jessup, The Court as Guardian of the Public Interest in Patent Cases (1943)
11 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 521, 529-30. Two federal courts in 1922 took judicial notice of the
prior art and invalidated patents when the defendants were estopped to attack their validity.
Standard Water Systems Co. v. Griscom-Russell Co., 278 Fed. 703 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1922) and
National Cash Register Co. v. Remington Arms Co., 283 Fed. 196 (D. Del, 1922). In the
Standard Water case, the court said: "This question, [of estoppel) however, seems to be im-
material in this case. The public is interested in every adjudication with respect to the
validity of a patent, and it is the duty of courts having jurisdiction of patent causes to have
regard, at all times, of the rights of the public, so that such rights may be rather enlarged
than diminished by judicial determination .... As before said, regardless of the principle
that an assignee of a patent cannot deny invention, it is the duty of the court to determine
lack of invention, where apparent, in order that the public interests may be guarded."
278 Fed. at 705, 707.
33. See Posnack, supra note 2, at 373.
34. "At the present time it is entirely possible for a patent which is intrinsically invalid
to be used by its owner as a threat to throttle competition .... And there is nothing the
government can do about it.. . . While the courts are asserting, more emphatically than
ever, that the public has a vital interest in patent grants, the government as the public's
agent is powerless to protect this interest against intrinsically invalid patents." Id, at
372-3. For a discussion of a bill proposed by Thurman Arnold to allow the Attorney-General
to intervene in infringement suits and to institute suits for the cancellation of patents used
in unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce, see Feuer, supra note 23, at 10-1.
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measures as the enlargement of the Patent Office staff; the securing of larger
appropriations; the selection and employment of more investigators with
better technical training; the establishment of a more efficient recordation
system for patents; 35 and, finally, the creation of a national patent labora-
tory where in so far as feasible all claims can be analyzed, tested, and com-
pared.
35. Although such exhaustive searches may entail more expense, is it not "worthwhile
to spend more in order to assure the issuance of valid patents upon which industry could
rely, than to spend less and risk the continued issuance of patents destined to be rendered
worthless to the discredit of the entire patent system." Posnack, supra note 2, at 374.
